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Abstract
This Note argues that the European Community (”EC”) should amend the European Com-
munity Treaty to provide authority for EC accession to the European Court of Human Rights
(”ECHR”) because the belief in and protection of human rights must be at the core of a thriving
constitutional legal system. As the EC continues to grow geographically, its legal competences
must also grow to deal with the challenges of building a singular, unified Europe from tradition-
ally autonomous European states and EC institutions. Part I of this Note explains the institutions
of the EC, examines the principles and objectives of the ECHR and its present application in the
EC, and discusses current human rights protection in the EC. Part II considers the objectives of
a unified Europe, the conflicting opinions regarding EC accession to the ECHR, and the present
lack of codification of human rights legislation in the EC. Part III argues that the necessity of enu-
merated, uniformly enforceable human rights protections at the EC level overrides claims that the
EC should not extend its competences to include accession to the ECHR. This Note concludes that
the EC should amend the European Community Treaty to include a provision for accession to the
ECHR.
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: AN ARGUMENT FOR TREATY REFORM
Tara C. Stever*
Law is to do what blood and iron have for centuries
failed to do. For only unity based on a freely-taken decision
can be expected to last; unity founded on the fundamental
values such as freedom and equality, and protected and trans-
lated into reality by law.1
INTRODUCTION
As the European Community looks to the future and antici-
pates continued growth in membership,2 the lack of clear
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1. Commission of the European Communities, The ABC of Community Law 28
(1986); WILLIA NICOLL & TREVOR C. SALMON, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES 48 n.9 (1990).
2. See MARTIN WESTLAKE, THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 390 (1995) (stat-
ing that there is anticipated future growth in European Community). Austria, Finland,
and Sweden acceded to the European Union in 1995, increasing the Member States of
the European Union to 15. Austria, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, Belgium,
France, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the
United Kingdom are members of the European Union. Id. Many other countries have
applied for membership, including Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia. Id.
The European Community has negotiated association and co-operation agreements
with many of the Central and Eastern European countries. Id. The June 1993 Copen-
hagen European Council agreed that the associated countries of Central and Eastern
Europe could become members of the European Union. Id. The European Council
agreed that accession negotiations with Malta and Cyprus should begin six months after
the end of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Id. The December 1994 Essen
European Council agreed to a detailed strategy to prepare for the future accession of
the Central and Eastern European countries. Id. The Cannes European Council in
June 1995, invited the eleven European countries, the Central and Eastern European
countries, the three Baltic states, Malta, and Cyprus, all of which intended to join the
Union at a future date, to meet with the current fifteen Member States. Id. Presenly,
the European Union has Europe Agreements with the following countries: Hungary
(1993); Poland (1993); Czech Republic (1994); Slovakia (1994); Romania (1994); and
Bulgaria (1994). See Letter from the Press and Public Affairs Committee of the Delega-
tion of the European Commission (Oct. 1996) [hereinafter Delegation Letter] (on file
with Fordham International Law Journal) (listing nations with which Community has
signed agreements). The European Union has Free Trade Agreements with: Estonia
(1994); Latvia (1994); and Lithuania (1994). Delegation Letter. In 1996, the Euro-
pean Union signed a Co-operation Agreement with Slovenia, and a Trade and Co-oper-
ation Agreement with Albania. Id.
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human rights legislation that is binding on the European Com-
munity as a whole raises concerns about continued European
unity,3 national sovereignty,4 and jurisdiction.5 The ever-grow-
ing scope of EC institutions6 has caused a need for reforms and
amendments to the foundation treaties' that form the present
framework of the European Community' to accommodate its
3. See Mary F. Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The European Community
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 14 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 639, 668 (1991) ("Civil and
political as well as economic and social rights are implicated by the ever-expanding
jurisdiction of the Community.").
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 668 (discussing implications of growing European Community on
human rights).
To assume benevolently that the Community's conduct will always be such that
it will not violate the rights of citizens who empower it is to ignore the constitu-
tional wisdom of its constituent parts .... As a federated Europe comes closer
to reality, it is essential that its institutional framework contain explicit, invo-
cable, and directly effective fundamental protections for those whom the gov-
ernments are designed to serve.
Id.
7. Manfred Zuleeg, A Community of Law: Legal Cohesion in the European Union, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 623, 623 (1997). The term "Foundation Treaties" was borrowed
from Manfred Zuleeg, Professor of Public Law at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Univer-
sity, former Judge at the European Court of Justice, and Visiting Professor at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley. Id.
8. See GEORGE BERMANN ET. AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW SELECrED DOCUMENTS
117 (1993) [hereinafter SELEGrED DOCUMENTS] (stating that foundation treaties form
framework of European Community). The Treaty on European Union ("TEU")
changed the name of the European Economic Community to the European Commu-
nity, reflecting the TEU's emphasis on the need for political and social cohesion among
the states of Europe. Id. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Br. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ.
L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC OWl Pub. Off. 1987). The TEU established a single
Union comprised of three European communities already in existence. Id. art. A, 1 3,
OJ. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727. The TEU represents the latest
stage in the process of creating an "ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."
Id. The TEU modifies and adds to the treaties establishing the three European commu-
nities, but it does not replace them. Id.; see WESTLAKE, supra note 2, at 8 & table 11.2
(explaining pillar structure of gradual extension of European Community into new pol-
icy areas). "The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose
systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy." P.S.R.F. MATHiJ-
SEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4 (6th ed. 1995); TEU, supra, art. F(1), O.J. C
224/1, at 6 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. at 728. The Communities, which continue to
fulfill their respective responsibilities, form the first of the three pillars upon which the
European Union is based. DERRICK WYATF & ALAN DAsHwOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 665 (3d ed. 1993). The European Community, as a subset of the European Union,
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unanticipated size.9 To achieve the goals underlying European
unification,'" the European Community should demonstrate its
remains the entity responsible for most European Union activity and, therefore, most
references should be to the European Community rather than the European Union.
GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAw 18
(1993). The only areas technically beyond the reach of the European Community are
the second and third pillars identified by the TEU, Provisions on a Common Foreign
and Security Policy ("C.F.S.P.") and Provisions on Co-operation in the Fields ofJustice
and Home Affairs. TEU, supra, tits. V, VI, O.J. C 224/1, at 94-97 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 729-35. The reference to "pillars" as an illustration on the structure of the
European Union is derived from the image of a Greek temple. WYATr & DASHWOOD,
supra, at 655. The term "European Union" refers to the political relationship between
the three pillars. Id. Member States were not ready to include the second and third
pillars within the European Community, therefore, the structure of the three pillars was
created. Id. That structure is held together by a single institutional framework, which
functions to ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in
order to attain EU objectives while at the same time respecting and building upon the
acquis communautaire. TEU, supra, art. C, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 727. The term acquis communautaire refers to the body of rules governing the Com-
munities in any field of activity. MATHIJSEN, supra, at 6 n.7; see DAVID O'KEEmF, Current
Issues in European Integration, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 11 (1992) (defining acquis corn-
munautaire as "the entire body of Community law, as contained in the Treaties, Acts of
Accession, legislation and the case-law of the European Court of Justice (with excep-
tions justified in the case of the protection of fundamental interests) as the common
legal basis" of Community law).
9. See WESTLAKE, supra note 2 at 390 (setting forth original Member States and
those states that have applied for membership or have entered into agreements with
the growing Community). Presently, the Member States of the European Union are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 366-
67, table XVI.4.1. Middle and Eastern European nations that have applied for member-
ship have different political and social histories than those nations that the founders of
the Community originally considered. Id.; see DR. KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION, THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 10 (1995) (describ-
ing founding of European Community). The founders of the European Union at the
signing of the first Treaty, setting up the European Coal and Steel Community on April
18, 1951 in Paris, were Paul van Zealand of Belgium, Joseph Bech of Luxembourg,
Joseph Maurice of Belgium, Count Carlo Sforza of Italy, Robert Schunam of France,
Konrad Adenauer of Germany, Dirk Stikker of the Netherlands, andJohannes van den
Brink of the Netherlands. Id.; see Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], as amended in
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
10. BORGHARDT, supra note 9, at 5-6. The European movement toward integration
arose from three main considerations: Europe's realization of its own weakness, the
conviction of the motto "Never Againl," that summed up the possibility of renewed
military conflict arising from internal state conflicts, and the earnest desire to create a
better, freer, and more just world in which international relations would be conducted
in a more orderly way. Id. The Preamble of the EC Treaty states that Member States
are:
Determined to lay the foundations of an even closer Union among the peo-
ples of Europe,
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respect for human rights by committing to uphold the principles
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" ("ECHR") and ensuring
that penalties for violations of its principles are uniformly ap-
plied at the state and EC level.'"
Although nations that already have accession agreements
with the European Community meet its requirements for acces-
sion, the European Community is expected to continue to
grow." An international organization that regulates and en-
forces respect for human rights is necessary, as violations of such
Resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by
common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe,
Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement
of the living and working conditions of their peoples,
Recognizing that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in
order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition,
Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their har-
monious development by reducing the differences existing between the vari-
ous regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions,
Desiring to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, to the pro-
gressive abolition of restrictions on international trade,
Intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas
countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in ac-
cordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace
and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their
ideal to join in their efforts,
Have decided to create a European Economic Community ....
EC Treaty, supra note 8, pmbl., [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 587-88.
11. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. The ECHR is an inter-
national human rights organization that contains definitions, mutual obligations, and a
control machinery to ensure that penalties for violations of its principles guarding
human rights are uniformly applied by its contracting parties. See FREDE CASTBERG, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS 5-7, 111-17 (1974) (describing human rights
and freedoms that ECHR guards). The terms "human rights" and "fundamental free-
doms" are also commonly referred to in the United States as civil rights. Id. (defining
concept of civil rights in terms of ECHR); compare ECHR, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [1950]
(outlining rights of contracting parties' citizens) with U.S. CONST. AMENDS. 1-28 (guar-
anteeing certain rights in United States).
12. See PAUL LEwIS, U.N. and U.S. Pressed on Rights Stance, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, Feb. 2,
1997, at 8 (stating human rights groups are increasing pressure on U.S. leaders to make
protection of people's human rights around world higher priority, and referencing let-
ter by director of Human Rights Watch, supported by Amnesty International and Law-
yers Committee for Human Rights, suggesting ways United Nations could do more to
defend human rights).
13. See WESTLAKE, supra note 2 at 390 (listing anticipated dates of accession of new
Member States to European Community).
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rights impede EC respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, a requirement of membership.' 4 Many EC Member
States have noted the importance of this task" and individually
belong to the ECHR. 16 The European Community, however, it is
not officially a signatory member.' 7
In April 1994, the Council of the European Union'
("Council") requested that the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") rule on whether Article 2281" of the EC Treaty allows the
14. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 32. "[Mlembership requires that the candidate
country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a function-
ing market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and mar-
ket forces within the Union." Id.
15. See Dominick, supra note 3, at 644 ("Demands for an unambiguous enumera-
tion of guaranteed rights that could be invoked against Community institutions subse-
quently grew, especially in the European Parliament."); see also id. at n.19 (citing Reso-
lution of April 27, 1979, O.J. C 127/69 (1979) (Scelba Report); Resolution of Oct. 29,
1982, O.J. C 304/253 (Gonnella Report); Resolution embodying the opinion of the
European Parliament on the memorandum from the Commission of European Com-
munities on the accession of the European Communities to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, O.J. C 304/253 (1982)).
Groups within the European Parliament, mainly the Institutional Affairs Committee
and the Committee on Legal Affairs and Civil Rights, have continually questioned the
sufficiency of Community human rights. See Dominick, supra, note 3, at 644 (relying on
O.J. Annex Nr. 2-337, Debats du Parlement European, Compte rendu des seances du 11
au mars 1986, at 99-103, 105-11 (reproducing statements of 1986 President, EC Council
of Ministers, Van den Broek (Neth.), participating)).
16. GERHARD WEGEN & CHRISTOPHER KUNER, Germany: Federal Constitutional Court
Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, 33 I.L.M. 943, 948 (1993). The number of ap-
plications to the Commission on Human Rights has increased from 404 in 1981 to 2037
in 1993. Id. The number is expected to continue to increase in light of the fact that
the ECHR is now better known and new states have and will probably continue to join
the ECHR. Id. It is estimated that by the year 2000, as more States join the Council of
Europe, between 35 and 40 states will be parties to the ECHR. Id.
17. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 146; HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY. METHODS OF PROTECrION 17 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter
COMMUNITY METHODS] (stating that Community is not Signatory Party to ECHR, and
therefore, ECHR has rejected applications against Community bodies).
18. See TEU, supra note 8, tits. V, VI, O.J. C 224/1, at 94-97 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 729-38 (adopting name Council of the European Union). The Presidency
of the Council rotates twice a year. See WEsTLAXE, supra note 2, at 45-47, 50-51 (stating
that occupation of Presidency allows Member States opportunity to focus on particular
policy priorities, for example, Spain's Presidency during second half of 1995 prioritized
Euro-Mediterranean Conference to improve Community relations with North African
countries facing Spain across Mediterranean).
19. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 228, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 714. Article 228 pro-
vides:
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the
Community and one or more States or international organizations, such
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European Community to accede20 to the ECHR.21 EC Member
States submitted amicus curiae briefs to the ECJ addressing the
agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers
vested in the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be concluded by
the Council, after consulting the European Parliament where required by this
Treaty. The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain before-
hand the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envis-
aged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of
the Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in
accordance with Article 236.
2. Agreements concluded under these conditions shall be binding on the in-
stitutions of the Community and on Member States.
Id. The TEU added Article 228 (a) to the EC Treaty, which provides:
Where it is provided, in a common position or in a joint action adopted ac-
cording to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the
common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to inter-
rupt or to reduce, in part or completely, economic relations with one or more
third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures. The
Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.
EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 228(a), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 715.
20. See Re the Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention,
Case 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (Mar. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Opinion 2/94]. Para-
graph 4 of section I of the Opinion 2/94 states:
With regard to the scope of accession, the Council states that each Com-
munity will have to adhere to the Convention within the framework of its pow-
ers and within the limits of the scope of its law .... Such accession should not
have any effect on the reservations entered by the Member States, parties to
the Convention, which will continue to apply in the areas falling within na-
tional jurisdiction. The Community would agree to submit to the machinery
for individual petitions and inter-State applications; actions between the Com-
munity and its Member States would, however, have to be excluded in recogni-
tion of the monopoly conferred in such matters by Article 219 of the EC
Treaty on the Court of Justice.
Id. at 269, § I, 4.
21. See Court Opinion on Accession to Human Rights Convention, REUTER EUR. COMMU-
Nrrv REP., Mar. 28, 1996 (BC cycle) (summarizing Opinion 2/94 of the ECJ, which held
that without treaty amendment, European Community cannot accede to European
Convention on Human Rights); Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 289, 3 (stating
that under Article 3b of EC Treaty, Community may only act within limits of powers
conferred upon it by EC Treaty and of objectives assigned by it). Article 235, which
permits the European Community to act without explicit power in order to attain the
objectives of the European Community, cannot be interpreted to confer the power to
accede on the European Community. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 235, OJ. C 224/1, at
5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 716. Article 235 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Coun-
cil shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
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issue of EC accession to the ECHR,2 and their respective argu-
ments demonstrated the division over the issue of accession. 3
In its March 1996 opinion, the ECJ held that the European Com-
munity could not accede to the ECHR2 4 because there is no EC
Treaty provision that confers power on the European Commu-
nity to enact rules or to conclude international conventions in
the area of human rights.2 5 Additionally, the ECJ held that Arti-
cle 23526 of the EC Treaty, which empowers the European Com-
munity to act in the absence of a specific provision when neces-
sary to achieve the purposes of the EC Treaty, does not confer
22. Opinion 2/94 [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 271-72, § II, 11 1-4. Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom submitted written observations. Additionally, the European Commis-
sion and the European Parliament submitted written observations. Id. On November
7, 1995, the ECJ entertained oral observations of Denmark, Greece, Spain, France, Ire-
land, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the
Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parlia-
ment. Id.
23. Id. 281-87, at § VI. The Commission, the Parliament, and the Austrian, Bel-
gian, Danish, Finnish, German, Greek, Italian, and Swedish Governments support ac-
cession by the European Community to the ECHR. Id. at 281-84, § VI, 1. France,
Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and the United Kingdom argued against accession, claiming
that it is incompatible with the EC Treaty and questioned the autonomy of the Commu-
nity legal order and the Eq's monopoly ofjurisdiction. Id. at 284-86, § VI, 2. The
Netherlands' Government, in its submission to the ECJ, notes the problems accession
presents, without taking a definite position. Id. at 286,87, § VI, 3.
24. Id. at 269, § I, 4. Opinion 2/94 states:
With regard to the scope of accession, the Council states that each Community
will have to adhere to the Convention within the framework of its powers and
within the limits of the scope of its law. Accession should cover the Conven-
tion and the Protocols which have come into force and been ratified by all the
Member States of the Community. Such accession should not have any effect
on the reservations entered by the Member States, parties to the Convention,
which will continue to apply in the areas falling within national jurisdiction.
The Community would agree to submit to the machinery for individual peti-
tions and inter-State applications; actions between the Community and its
Member States would, however, have to be excluded in recognition of the
monopoly conferred in such matters by Article 219 of the EC Treaty on the
Court of Justice.
Id.
25. Id. at 290, 27. "No Treaty Provision confers on the Community institutions
any general power to enact rules on human rights or to conclude international conven-
tions in this field." Id. But see Opinion 2/91 of Mar. 19, 1993, [1993] ECR 1-1061, 1-
1076-77, § II, 7, 8 (holding that European Community is empowered to enter into
international commitments necessary for attainment of that objective even in absence
of express provision to that effect, and EC Treaty may be read to imply such powers
from its direct provisions).
26. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 235, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R1
at 716.
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sufficient authority to allow for EC accession to the ECHR. 7
The ECJ determined that a modification of the EC institutional
system to allow for EC accession to the ECHR would be of consti-
tutional significance 2 and is beyond the scope of EC Treaty Arti-
cle 235.29 Such accession, therefore, could only occur by amend-
ing the treaties establishing the European Community.
0
27. Opinion 2/94 [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 290, 1 28-30. Opinion 2/94 states:
In the absence of express or implied powers for this purpose, it is necessary to
consider whether Article 235 of the Treaty may constitute a legal basis for
accession. Article 235 is designed to fill the gap where no specific provisions
of the Treaty confer on the Community institutions express or implied powers
to act, if such powers appear none the less to be necessary to enable the Com-
munity to carry out its functions with a view to attaining one of the objectives
laid down by the Treaty. That provision, being an integral part of an institu-
tional system based on the principle of conferred powers, cannot serve as a
basis for widening the scope of Community powers beyond the general frame-
work created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in particular, by
those that define the tasks and the activities of the Community. On any view,
Article 235 cannot be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose
effect would, in substance, be to amend the Treaty without following the pro-
cedure which it provides for that purpose.
Id. at 291, 35-36. The ECJ continued, stating:
Such a modification of the system for the protection of human rights in the
Community, with equally fundamental institutional implications for the Com-
munity and for the Member States, would be of constitutional significance and
would therefore be such as to go beyond the scope of Article 235. It could be
brought about only by way of a Treaty amendment.... [A]s Community law
now stands, the Community has no competence to accede to the Convention.
Id. at 1 35-36.
28. See JAMES D. DINNAGE & JOHN F. MuRsHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
EuRoPEAN UNION xvii (1996) (stating that legal entity of European Union possesses
constitution).
29. See Opinion 2/94, (1996) 2 C.M.L.R. at 291, at 36 (concluding that European
Community has no competence to accede to ECHR under present EC law).
30. See id. at 291, 1 35 (suggesting that, as European Community cannot accede to
ECHR under present treaty, EC Treaty must be amended); see also EC Treaty, supra
note 8, art. 238, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 717 (stating that international agreements may
call for amendment of EC Treaty). Article 238 provides:
The Community may conclude with one or more States or international orga-
nizations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights
and obligations, common action and special procedures.
These agreements shall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously and
after receiving the majority of its component members.
Where such agreements call for amendments to this Treaty, these amend-
ments shall first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 236.
Id. Article N of the TEU, which replaced Article 236, states:
1. The government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to
the Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the Union
if founded.
EUROPEAN UNION TREATY REFORM
This Note argues that the European Community should
amend the EC Treaty to provide authority for EC accession to
the ECHR because the belief in and protection of human rights
must be at the core of a thriving constitutional legal system."1 As
the European Community continues to grow geographically, its
legal competences must also grow to deal with the challenges of
building a singular, unified Europe from traditionally autono-
mous European states and EC institutions.3 2 Part I of this Note
explains the institutions of the European Community, examines
the principles and objectives of the ECHR and its present appli-
cation in the European Community, and discusses current
human rights protection in the European Community. Part II
considers the objectives of a unified Europe, the conflicting
opinions regarding EC accession to the ECHR, and the present
lack of codification of human rights legislation in the European
Community. Part III argues that the necessity of enumerated,
uniformly enforceable human rights protections at the EC level
overrides claims that the European Community should not ex-
tend its competences to include accession to the ECHR. This
Note concludes that the European Community should amend
the EC Treaty to include a provision for accession to the ECHR.
I. A UNiFIED EUROPE
After World War II, several European nations, desiring eco-
nomic and political unity, formed what eventually became the
If the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where ap-
propriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favor of calling a confer-
ence of representatives of the governments of the Member States, the confer-
ence shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of
determining by common accord the amendments to be made to those Trea-
ties. The European Central Bank shall also be consulted in the case of institu-
tional changes in the monetary area.
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional require-
ments.
2. A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States
shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this Treaty for which
revision is provided, in accordance with objectives set out in Articles A and B.
TEU, supra note 8, art. N, OJ. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739.
31. See CASTBERG, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that belief in existence of human
rights is true greamess of Western culture and civilization).
32. See CoMMuNrIY METHODS, supra note 17, at 2-3 (discussing growth of EC com-
petences).
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European Community.33 The European Community does not
belong to the ECHR,34 which seeks to prevent and resolve con-
flicts between European States regarding human rights viola-
tions 5 such as the recent violations in Turkey3 6 and Belarus.37
Limited human rights protection at the EC level derives from
the EC Treaty and the common constitutional traditions of EC
Member States. 38
A. The Forming of the European Union
The concept of European unification was sparked during
the reconstruction period in Europe after World War II, follow-
ing a history of instability.3 9 The Member States established a
series of treaties that governed the newly-emerging structure in
Europe.40 These treaties, however, have evolved and been ab-
sorbed by the EC Treaty and the TEU.41 Interplay between EC
institutions form the governing framework of the European
Community.4" The ECJ interprets the laws set down by these in-
stitutions and applies them to the Member States, indicating the
superiority of EC laws over Member States' national laws.43 The
growth in the number of EC Member States and states vying for
EC membership, presents challenges to the governing frame-
33. See BERMANN ET A.., supra note 8, at 3-5 (describing postwar movement towards
creation of European Community).
34. See COMMUNrY METHODS, supra note 17, at 17 (stating that European Commu-
nity is not contracting party to ECHR).
35. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 7 (stating goals underlying ECHR formation).
36. LEwis, supra note 12, at 8. In its report to the Human Rights Commission,
Amnesty International requested that the Commission single out five countries for pub-
lic censure in 1997, including Turkey, for its "persistent, severe and systematic viola-
tions of human rights." Id.
37. See Helen Womack, Belarus Poll Paves Way to Dictatorship, THE INDEPENDENT,
Nov. 25, 1996, at 11 (noting human rights violations in Belarus).
38. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 6 (suggesting postwar reconstruction pro-
vided initiative to create European unity).
39. See Emile Noel, The Institutions of the European Community, 15 SUFFOLK TRANS-
NAT'L L.J. 514, 515 (1992) (discussing formation of European communities).
40. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 5-10 (discussing original three treaties
governing European Communities, ECSC, EEC, and Euratom).
41. TEU, supra note 8, art. A, 2, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
726. Article A states that the TEU "marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe." Id.
42. WEGEN & KUNER, supra note 16, at 247.
43. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 192 (discussing Member States obligation
to implement EC laws).
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work of the European Community."
1. History of European Community's Founding
Throughout history, contradictory, competitive, and plural-
ist attitudes have made Europe fragile. 45 After centuries of wars
and expansionist philosophies,4 it became clear that a structure,
other than that of singular and powerful nation states, was
needed to provide stability in Europe.47 This was not a new con-
cept.48 Originally, the desire for peace was the greatest factor
propelling Europe towards unity.4 9
44. See COMMUNITY METHODS, supra note 17, at 7 (discussing new human rights
concerns facing and challenging European Community as it moves toward year 2000,
including biotechnology and environmental issues, human rights issues arising from
EU growth, and historical human rights violations, such as gender discrimination).
45. NicoLL & SALMON, supra note 1, at 1.
46. Id. at 1-2.
47. Id. at 3-4. "This was the advocacy of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a Hun-
garian nobleman who founded in 1923 the Pan-European movement.., and won the
support of several leading and active politicians, especially in France." Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 1-2; HAL. FISHER, A HIsToRY OF EUROPE 579 (1938). In the Sixteenth
Century, Henry IV of France formulated the idea of a Great Republic of Europe, bring-
ing together the religions, principalities, and kingdoms of Europe to co-exist in peace.
NIcOLL & SALMON, supra note 1, at 2. In 1693, William Penn published an essay advo-
cating the institution of a European estates general or a European Parliament which
would mediate disputes among the sovereigns and anticipate resulting future peace in
Europe. Id. William Penn was an English author, who was forced by his unpopularity
within his family and the law of England to travel throughout Europe and witness the
devastation of its wars. Id. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant published his
version of a federation of free states in his 1795 treatise "Towards Perpetual Peace." Id.
The notion of people participating in government, represented by a European Parlia-
ment that is independent of the national states and empowered to settle disagreements
among the states, dates back to Saint-Simon's reflections on the U.S. Revolution and
constitution-building, and his subsequent publication "On the Reorganization of Euro-
pean Society," in 1814. Id. at 3.
49. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 12. Borchardt states:
[T]here [have] been schemes for a peaceful, voluntary association of States on
terms of equality, especially after the harrowing experience of the First World
War. In 1923, for example, the Austrian founder-leader of the Pan-European
Movement, Count Coudenhove Dalergi, had called for the creation of a
United States of Europe, citing such examples as the successful assertion of
Swiss unity in 1848, the forging of the German Empire in 1871 and, before all
else, the independence of the United States of America in 1776. And on 5
September 1929, in a now famous speech to the League of Nations Assembly
in Geneva, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, with the backing of
his German counterpart, Gustav Stresemann, proposed the creation of a Euro-
pean union within the framework of the League of Nations. In that case,
though, the immediate aim went no further than securing closer cooperation
between the States of Europe, leaving their national sovereignty intact.
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In 1948, after the Second World War, the leaders of Euro-
pean nations formed a Council of Europe,50 aimed at achieving
closer unity among European nations.51 In response to an offer
of U.S. aid by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall5 2 in 1947,
the rebuilding of Europe began. 3 This period of reconstruction
in Europe sparked the beginning of European unification.54 Na-
Id.; NICOLL & SALMON, supra note 1, at 1-8. Even during the height of British imperial-
ism, Lord Salisbury wrote:
The federated action of Europe, if we can maintain it, is our sole hope of
escaping from the constant terror and calamity of war, the constant pressure
of the burdens of an armed peace, which weigh down the spirits and dampen
the prospect of every Nation in this part of the world. The Federation of Eu-
rope is the only hope we have.
Id.; HAROLD MACMILLAN, TIDES OF FORTUNE 1945-1955 151 (1969).
50. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 6-7 (describing Council of Europe as different
from EU Council in that it is not organizational institution of the EU framework, but
rather, has separate and distinct membership). On May 5, 1949, leaders of European
nations met at the Hauge and founded the Council of Europe in order to foster polit-
ical cooperation between its Member States and serve as an instrument of intergovern-
mental cooperation, separate from the European Communities, that pursues closer
links between the countries of Europe and promotes their economic and social pro-
gress. Id. The Council of Europe oversees a wide range of economic, cultural, social,
and legal conventions, the most significant and best known of them being the ECHR,
adopted on November 4, 1950. Id.
51. NICOLL & SALMON, supra note 1, at 7.
52. See ROBERT PAYNE, The Marshall Story: A Biography of General George C. Marshall,
300-01 (1952) (describing Marshall's influence on U.S. and international affairs). In
1947, he declared "an idea which translates the problem from one of individual coun-
tries to one of a continent .... " Id. at 300. Payne further states:
The virtue of the Marshall Plan was that it was concerned with large wholes
.... Marshall specifically asked the nations of Europe to declare their needs
jointly-'The program should be a joint one agreed to by a number, if not all
European nations.' He also said that 'the initiative should come from Eu-
rope,' though in fact the initiative had come from the small policy-planning
group around the President [of the United States]. Early in July the repre-
sentatives of sixteen nations assembled in Paris... to work out the details of
European needs, the American Government demanding the utmost speed.
Id. at 300-01.
53. NICOLL & SALMON, supra note 1, at 8 & n.22; see PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOM-
ICS 672 (1955) (explaining U.S. contribution to European unification). Further consid-
eration of this proposal led to the Schuman plan, which essentially launched the estab-
lishment of the first of the European Communities. NICOLL & SALMON, supra note 1, at
8 & n.23.
54. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 6. Borchardt states:
Viewed as a whole, the postwar steps towards European unification offer a
confusing picture that is calculated to baffle anyone but the expert. A host of
different organizations, largely unconnected, have come into existence side by
side: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the Western European Union (WEU), the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO), the Council of Europe, and the European Union, which
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tions entered into agreements that were no longer based on the
fear of war, but rather, on the desire for economic and political
unity55 and stability.56 European nations created three separate
Communities to establish a common market, advance economic
policies, promote economic growth and stability, and raise the
standard of living.17
2. Treaties
The progression towards a unified Europe formally began
in 1951 with the signing of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity Treaty58 ("ECSC Treaty") for the purpose of promoting
free trade and regulating production in the coal and steel indus-
tries. 59 This was followed by the establishment of the European
is itself built on the foundations of the European Coal and Steel Community,
the European Atomic Energy Community and European (Economic) Com-
munity.
Id
55. See European YearAgainst Racism and Xenophobia, Jan. 16, 1996, Europe Informa-
tion Service, European Social Policy, § 59. (noting continuous importance of eliminat-
ing divisive factors from Europe). 1997 has been termed the "European Year Against
Racism and Xenophobia" to demonstrate Europe's continual struggle to combat ethno-
centrism in its quickly growing and ever-diversifying population. Id.
56. NxCOLL & SALMON, supra note 1, at 15.
57. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 2-3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588-89 (listing goals
of European unification).
58. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 9, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. Signatory nations were
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. JOHN SPANIER,
AMERICAN FOREIGN PouC SINCE WORLD WAR II 35-47 (1980) (describing motivations
behind establishment of ECSC). BORCHAanT, supra note 9, at 10. The signatories of
the European Coal and Steel Community on April 18, 1951 in Paris, were Paul van
Zealand of Belgium, Joseph Bech of Luxembourg, Joseph Meurice of Belgium, Count
Carlo Sforza of Italy, Robert Schumam of France, Konrad Adenauer of Germany, Dirk
Stikker of the Netherlands, and Johannes van den Brink of the Netherlands. Id. In the
pre-industrial era, coal was essential to a modernized nation. WEsrLAxE, supra note 2, at
1-4. Nations of Europe, therefore, needed to protect this energy source, and the
coalfields were a potential source of economic tension and even war. Id. Much of the
desired coal was located on the political faultline between France and Germany. Id.
This area was devastated by the
Second World War, and, as reconstruction and the Cold War began, the possibility of
economic rivalries seemed inevitable. Id. The conclusion reached was that France and
Germany should relinquish all of their national sovereignty over coal and steel produc-
tion and pool it in an independent, supranational organization. Id. This idealogy even-
tually led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. Id.
59. See ECSC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2, 261 U.N.T.S. at 145 (maintaining produc-
tivity throughout creation of common market is main purpose of integration); id. art.
4(a), 261 U.N.T.S. at 147 (eliminating restrictions and taxes on movement of coal and
steel among Member States).
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Economic Community6 ° ("EEC") in 1958 and the European
Atomic Energy Community6' ("Euratom"), also in 1958.62 In
1985, the Single European Act6" ("SEA") was signed with the in-
tent to complete the creation of the internal market by January
1, 1993.14 The Treaty on European Union65 ("TEU"), signed on
February 7, 1992, combined the ECSC, EEC, and EAEC, and es-
tablished a European Community.6 6 The EC Treaty encom-
passes all of these treaties and is the governing treaty of the Eu-
ropean Community.6 7
60. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. "[T]he principal function of the
EEC was to establish a common market and the progressive approximation of the eco-
nomic policies of the member nations through harmonious development of economic
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated
raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the states belonging to it."
ANTHoNYJ. DAVIS, Canada's Constitutional Crisis After Meech Lake: Setting a New Course for
European Union? 18 SYRACUSE INT'L L. & COM. 223, 251 (1992) (citation omitted).
61. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987).
62. Noel, supra note 39, at 515. A single European Community formed by merg-
ing the three original Communities was proposed but never achieved during the 1985
negotiations of the Single European Act. Id.; see also SEA, supra note 8, O.J. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (extending Community's field of competence and bring-
ing about significant changes in relations between institutions and their operating
rules). The SEA entered into force on July 1, 1987, and gave legal status to Community
political cooperation, which has been operational on the basis of intergovernmental
agreements since 1970. Noel, supra note 39, at 516.
63. SEA, supra note 8, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
64. COMMUNITY METHODS, supra note 17, at 1.
65. TEU, supra note 8, art. C, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727-
28. The TEU is the "single institutional framework which ... ensure[s] the consistency
and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain [EU] objectives while
respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire." Id.; see WEsrLAxE, supra note
2, at 7, table I1.1 (mapping basic policy processes outlined in previous treaties, now
merged into TEU).
66. See TEU, supra note 8, art. A, 8, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 727 (stating that TEU modifies and adds to treaties establishing three European com-
munities).
67. Id. art. C, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727-28. Article C
states:
The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall en-
sure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to
attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis com-
munautaire.
The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as
a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and devel-
opment policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for
ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these
policies, each in accordance with its respective powers.
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a. Treaty on European Union
The TEU demonstrates EC devotion to the ultimate goal of
an ever closer European Community and stresses the need for
social and political unity.68 The TEU formally replaced the term
European Economic Community with the term European Com-
munity69 and developed the pillar model of European Union
composition,70 reflecting a newly-placed EC emphasis on the so-
cial sphere in addition to the economic and political spheres ad-
dressed in the previous treaties. 71 The TEU represents the latest
development in EC law72 and its amendments supersede all pre-
vious EC law.73
Recognizing the European Community's ever-changing na-
ture, the TEU provides a forum for discussing amendments of
the TEU by way of an Intergovernmental Conference 74 ("IGC"),
Id.
68. Id. art. A, 2, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 726; see supra
note 41 (citing text of Article A).
69. TEU, supra note 8, art. G, O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 729.
70. See WESmAKE, supra note 2, at 8, table 1I.2 (explaining three pillars on which
European Union is based). The three pillars on which the European Union is built are
the European Community method; Intergovernmental affairs, including Common For-
eign and Security Policy, and Intergovernmental affairs, including co-operation in the
fields of justice and home affairs. Id. The pillar theory developed from the need for
the expansion of the European Community method into new areas, such as foreign
policy. Id. The European Community method consists largely of the legislative process
in the European Union. Id. The Council acts on the basis of Commission proposals,
and the Commission can withdraw such proposal at any time. Id. For many acts, the
Council is obligated to consult the Parliament, and all of the acts are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Eq. Id. at 6.
71. TEU, supra note 8, art. B, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727.
72. Nicholas Stewart, The Relationship Between the European Court of Justice and the
Courts of the Member States of the European Communities, 5 AUT INT'L L. PRAcrnCUM 41
(1992) (stating that Community law refers to the laws relating to the EC Treaty, which
has merged prior EC law). Community law also derives from the constitutional tradi-
tions of Member States. Id. at 42 (describing source of Community law).
73. TEU, supra note 8, art. A, 2, OJ. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
726; see supra note 41 (citing text of Article A).
74. See TEU, supra note 8, art. N, O.J. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
739 (requiring conference of representatives of governments of Member States in 1996
to examine, in accordance of objectives set out in Articles A and B, provisions of TEU
for which revision is provided). "The convening of the Intergovernmental Conference
... provides a golden opportunity to (a) broaden the Community's powers and (b)
inspire decisionmaking." 24 E.C. BuLL., no. 2, Inteigovernmental Conferences: Contribu-
tions by the Commission, at 75; WtsnmiAm, supra note 2, at 55-56 (explaining procedures,
responsibilities and participants of Intergovernmental Conference); June 1996 Euro-
pean Council Presidency Conclusions, Doc. 96/3 (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) at 6-7 (listing aims of Intergovernmental Conference, to be completed by
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a negotiation between Member State governments that exists
outside the framework of the European Community's proce-
dures and institutions75 and consists of representatives from
Member State governments. 76 The TEU also formally in-
troduces the principle of subsidiarity into the governing frame-
work of the European Community.77 Finally, the TEU stresses
the importance of EC citizenship and provides the European
Community with deadlines regarding the progression toward ac-
cession.78
mid-1997). The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference was scheduled to address the in-
stitutional consequences of Union enlargement. J.E.S. FAWCETr, APPLICATION OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIZGHTS 392 (1969); see Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2
C.M.L.R. at 279, § V, 2 (discussing European Community enlargement and human
rights issues).
The Italian Government, in its oral observations, points out that all the Mem-
ber States, acting within their powers, have voluntarily submitted to the inter-
national control machinery for the protection of human rights. The transfer
of State powers to the Community requires that the Community be subject to
the same international control in order to restore the balance originally de-
sired by the Member States.
Id.; DU JUR HJALTE RASMUSSEN, Toward a Normative Theory of Interpretation of Community
Law, 1992 U. CHI. LEG. FORUM 135, 150 (suggesting that Community competences
should change with times).
75. Delegation of the European Commission, Intergovernmental Conferences: An
Overview (on file with THE INTERNATIONAL LAwJouRNAL).
76. TEU, supra note 8, art. N, O.J. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739.
77. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 3(b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. Article 3(b) states:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently be
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.; NICOLL & SALMON, supra note 1, at 3.
This principle teaches that government can be organised in layers - from the
local community up to world level - each layer possessing the competence
which it can discharge better than those above or below it. Seen from the
viewpoint of a unitary state this is decentralization. Seen from the smallest
unit it is federation, and one in which there need be no contradiction between
the loyalties paid to each layer - a Yorkshireman can comfortably be a North-
erner, an Englishman, a Briton, a European and a citizen of the world.
Id.; see George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in The European Com-
munity and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331 (1994) (discussing whether sub-
sidiarity issues will present obstacles to effective EC action).
78. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 8, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 595 (setting forth
requirements of EU citizenship).
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b. EC Treaty
The EC Treaty encompasses all EC laws, including those set
out in the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom Treaties. The EC Treaty
also incorporates the changes made by subsequent treaties, the
most recent of which is the TEU.79 The main purposes of the
EC Treaty are the establishment of a common market, 80 the pro-
motion of economic activities,8' the expansion of the European
Community,8 2 the promotion of stability,83 and an increase in
emphasis on the European people. 4
3. Institutional Framework
The main institutions of the European Community are the
European Commission8" ("Commission"), the European Parlia-
ment8 6 ("Parliament"), the European Council,8 7 and the ECJ.
79. TEU, supra note 8, art. A, 2, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
726; see supra note 41 (citing text of Article A).
80. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 588. Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies
or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Com-
munity a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sus-
tainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high de-
gree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment
and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life,
and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682; see WEsTLKE, supra note 2, at 339, table
XIV.2.1. (enumerating Commission powers and duties, including advisory, manage-
ment, regulatory, and safeguarding measures).
86. See WESrLAKE, supra note 2, at 342-43 (discussing powers of Council and Parlia-
ment).
87. Id. at 18. No records are kept of the European Council's proceedings,
although, Article D of the TEU mandates that the European Council submit a report to
the European President after each of its meetings and a yearly written report on the EU
progress. TEU, supra note 8, art. D, OJ. C 224/1, at 5 (1992),[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728.
Article D states:
The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for
its development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof.
The European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or Government
of the member-States and the President of the Commission. They shall be as-
sisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member-States and by a Mem-
ber of the Commission. The European Council shall meet at least twice a year,
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The interrelation of these institutions comprises the framework
of the European Community.88 Interplay among them and with
the various Member State institutions is unavoidable, causing
questions of jurisdiction to arise. 89
a. The Council of the European Union and the European
Commission
The Council and Commission issue general regulations, di-
rectives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions.90 Regula-
tions are binding on all Member States.91 Directives are binding
on Member States only as to the results achieved9" and decisions
are binding on the government, enterprise, or individual ad-
dressed.93 Recommendations and opinions are not binding.94
1. The Council
The Council is the European Union's legislative body and
has accrued considerable executive powers. 95 The Council's pri-
mary function is to ensure the coordination of Member States'
economic policies.96 The Council consists of one representative
under the chairmanship of the Head of State or Government of the member-
State which holds the Presidency of the Council.
The European Council shall submit to the European Parliament a report after
each of its meetings and a early written report on the progress achieved by the
Union.
Id.
88. WEGEN & KUNER, supra note 16, at 247.
89. TEU, supra note 8, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 719; WEGEN
& KUNER, supra note 16, at 247.
90. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693; see also id. art. 145
(outlining responsibilities of Council); id. arts. 155-63, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-80,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-84 (outlining responsibilities of Commission).
91. Id. art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693. Article 189, in pertinent part, states that
a "regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and di-
rectly applicable in all member-States." Id.
92. Id. art. 189, in pertinent part, states, "[a] directive shall be binding, as to the
result to be achieved, upon each member-State to which it is addressed, but shall leave
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." Id.
93. Id. Regarding decisions, Article 189 states, "[a] decision shall be binding in its
entirety upon those to whom it is addressed." Id.
94. Id. Regarding recommendations, Article 189 states, "[r]ecommendations and
opinions shall have no binding force." Id. at 694; see Noel, supra note 39, at 519
(describing application of recommendations and opinions).
95. See WESTLAKE, supra note 2, at 340 (describing functions of Council of Euro-
pean Union).
96. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-80 (setting forth
responsibilities of Council). Article 145 states:
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from each Member State who is authorized to commit his or her
respective government to agreed-upon measures. 97 The presi-
dent of the Council holds a two-year position, allowing the Mem-
ber State from which the president comes to focus the Council's
attention on particular policy priorities.98
2. The European Commission
The Commission" acts as the executive branch of the Euro-
pean Community, initiating policy and defending EC interest in
the Council.100 The Commission is independent from individual
national governments and the Council.10 1 It consists of seven-
teen members, with no more than two members coming from
any Member State, chosen on the basis of competence and com-
To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Council
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:
- ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the member-States;
- have power to take decisions;
-confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for
the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down. The Council
may impose certain requirements in respect of the exercise of these powers.
The Council may also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise directly
implementing powers itself. The procedures referred to above must be conso-
nant with principles and rules to be laid down in advance by the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining
the Opinion of the European Parliament.
Id.
97. WESTLAYE, supra note 2, at 45-47, 50-51.
98. See id. at 46 (stating that Presidency is important to Member States because it
gives a Member State possibility of ensuring that its particular policy priorities are
brought to fore).
99. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 155-63, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-84 (setting
forth powers of Commission). Article 155 instills in the Commission powers tradition-
ally associated with an executive branch of government, and states:
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common
market, the Commission shall:
- ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the insti-
tutions pursuant thereto are applied;
- formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this
Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers is necessary;
- have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures
taken by the Council and by the European Parliament in the manner provided
for in this Treaty-,
-exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of
the rules laid down by the latter.
Id., art 155, [1992) 1 C.M.L.R. at 682; see BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 57-63 (discuss-
ing Commisison's composition and duties).
100. Noel, supra note 39, at 524.
101. WrsrLAKE, supra note 2, at 339.
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plete independence. 10 2 The governments of Member States con-
sult with the European Parliament and nominate the Commis-
sion President. 10 3
The Commission proposes EC legislation that, if passed by
the Council, the Commission then implements. 0 4 It also en-
sures that the provisions of the EC Treaty and measures taken by
EC institutions in their implementation of EC Treaty provisions
are consistent with the proper functioning and development of
the common market.'05 When the Commission determines that
a violation of EC law has occurred, the Commission investigates
and rules on the issue.'0 6 If the questioned activity is not recti-
fied by the Commission's specified deadline, the Commission
may refer the matter to the ECJ.10 7 The Commission's actions
are subject to review by the ECJ.' 8
b. Parliament
Parliament has come to play an increasingly important role
in EC decision-making procedure. 1 9 Parliament oversees the
Commission and guarantees that the Commission will represent
102. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 157, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682.
103. Id., art. 158, [1992) 1 C.M.L.R. at 683. After consulting with the nominee for
President, the governments of the Member States nominate the other Members of the
Commission. WESTLAKE, supra note 2, at 339. The President and the other Members of
the Commission are subject as a body to a vote of approval by the European Parliament
Id. After approval by Parliament, the governments of the Member States appoint the
Commission President and new Members by common accord.
104. Id., art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682; see A.G. TOTH, THE OxFoRD ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNTY LAw 70 (1990) (describing legislative process of Euro-
pean Community).
105. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.1. at 682; see supra note 89
(citing text of Article 155).
106. See WESTLAK,, supra note 2, at 357, table XVI.2.1 (giving general overview of
decision-making process in European Union and explaining interaction among Com-
mission, Council, Council of Ministers, European Council, and Parliament).
107. Id.
108. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 173, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687. In pertinent part,
Article 173 states:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the
European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the commis-
sion and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts
of the European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third
parties.
Id.
109. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 25. The extension of Parliament's duties is "in
response to the concern to rectify the democratic deficit with which existing forms of
international governmental co-operation have often been reproached." WESTLAKE,
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faithfully EC interests.11 ° Members of Parliament are elected for
EC-level political groups by universal suffrage. 1 The 1987
SEA112 granted Parliament the power of assent regarding the
conclusion of association agreements 13 and the accession of
new Member States. 14 The TEU expanded the Parliament's
power" 5 and provided that the President of the Council should
supra note 2, at 243; see BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 6368 (discussing composition
and duties of Parliament).
110. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 137-44, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676-79 (defin-
ing powers of Parliament); see aLso TEU, supra note 8, art. 138a, OJ. C 224/1, at 56
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676-77 (stating that Parliament expresses political will of
citizens and noting that political parties at Community level are important factor for
integration).
111. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 138, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676. Article 138 states,
"[t]he representatives in the European Parliament of the peoples of the States brought
together in the Community shall be elected by universal suffrage." Id.
112. SEA, supra note 8, art. 7, OJ. L 169/1, at 5-6 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.LR. at 745
(replacing Article 149 of EEC Treaty). Article 7 states, in pertinent part:
The European Parliament may within the period of three months
referred to in point (b), by an absolute majority of its component members,
propose amendments to the Council's composition. The European Parlia-
ment may also, by the same majority, reject the Council's composition. The
result of the proceedings shall be transmitted to the Council and the Commis-
sion.
If the European Parliament has rejected the Council's composition, unanimity
shall be required for the Council to act on a second reading.
Id.; see arts. 6-12, 17-18, OJ. L 169/1, at 5-8 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 744-47, 748-49
(requiring cooperation of action of Council with European Parliament).
113. See WEsrLAm, supra note 2, at 390 (discussing association agreements and
listing states that have entered into association and other agreements with European
Community).
114. Id. at 342-43; TEU, supra note 8, art. 0, OJ. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 739. Article 0 provides:
Any European State may apply to become a Member of the Union. It shall
address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after con-
sulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parlia-
ment, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.
The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the
Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an
agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agree-
ment shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accord-
ance with their respective constitutional requirements.
Id.; see Davis, supra note 60, at 256 (discussing Treaty of Accession and Act, which con-
cerned conditions of accession that were concluded in Madrid on June 12, 1985, and
were effective January 1, 1986).
115. See TEU, supra note 8, art. 137, 0J. C 224/1, at55 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 676. Article 137 states that the "European Parliament, which shall consist of repre-
sentatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community, shall exer-
cise the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty," omitting the language of confine-
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consult the Parliament regarding common foreign and security
policy, amounting to a power to authorize ratification of new
Member States.116
c. European Council
The European Council" 7 is a provider of political impetus
and synthesis,118 and ensures the general economic policies of
Member States." 9 The EC Treaty confers the power to imple-
ment the Council's rules on the Commission.12 ' The European
Council is comprised of the Member States' Heads of State and
the President of the Commission,12 1 assisted by the Member
States' Ministers for Foreign Affairs and another Member of the
Commission. 122 Functions of the European Council include de-
fining the guidelines for integration, coordinating, monitoring,
and enlarging the scope of European cooperation, issuing decla-
rations on foreign relations, defacto decision-making, and policy
monitoring.1 23  The European Council also provides EU gen-
eral, political, and economic guidelines, enhances mutual un-
derstanding, and introduces more predictability into intergov-
ernmental relations.1 24 The European Council provides a forum
for informal exchanges, and the records of its activities remain
ment found in Article 137 of the original EC Treaty to advisory and supervisory powers.
Id.
116. WESTLAKE, supra note 2, at 343.
Parliament has come a long way from its initial position regarding interna-
tional agreements, where it was merely consulted on a limited category of such
agreements and received no information on their negotiation. Its powers,
under the assent procedure, are comparable to the right to authorize ratifica-
tion that most national parliaments enjoy, and its access to information on the
conduct of negotiations is actually better than many national parliaments.
Id. (quoting CORBET ET AL., THE EUROPEAN PARLLAMENr 217 (3d ed. 1995)).
117. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 145-54, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-82 (describ-
ing functions and composition of Council).
118. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13 (stating European Council has become
forum for discussing sensitive political matters).
119. WEsrtLAE, supra note 2, at 18; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 55-57 (discuss-
ing duties of European Council).
120. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 145, (1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679.
121. See WESTLYAE, supra note 2, at 339 (defining duties of President of Commis-
sion).
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id. at 26-31; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 55-57 (discussing functions of
European Council).
124. WasrLAitt, supra note 2, at 26-31.
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unpublished.'25
d. The ECJ
The ECJ is the judicial branch of the European Union.'26
Although it has no general, inherent jurisdiction, 2 7 the ECJ has
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of
the EC Treaty and to decide the validity and interpretation of
secondary EC law.' 28 The EJ requires that EU Member State
125. London Declaration of the European Council 30, EC BULL. no. 6 at 29-30 (1977).
126. EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 164-88, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684-93. The ECJ
consists of thirteen Judges who are chosen from people who are independent and qual-
ified, for terms of six years. Id. art. 167, [1992] C.M.L.R. at 684. Every three years there
is a partial replacement of the Judges. Id. The judges deciding Opinion 2/94 were:
Presiding, Rodriguez Iglesias, P.; Kakouris, Edward, Puissochet and Hirsch PPC; Man-
cini, Shockweiler (Rapporteur), Moitinho de Almeida, Kapteyn, Gulmann, Murray,
Jann, Ragnemalm, Sevan and WatheletJJ. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265. The
judges are also assisted by Advocates-General. E.C. Treaty, supra note 8, art. 166, [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 685. "It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting with complete
impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases
brought before the Court ofJustice, in order to assist the Court in the performance of
the task assigned to it in Article 164." Id.; see Noel, supra note 39, at 518. The EC also
has a Court of Auditors, whose twelve members are appointed by unanimous decision
of the Council after consultation with the Parliament. Id. The Court of Auditors audits
the accounts of the Community, examines revenue and expenditures, and checks the
financial management of the European Union. Id. The Court of Auditors then reports
back to the various institutions of the European Community. In 1989, the Court of First
Instance was established, in response to the full docket of the ECJ. BER u ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 72-73 (discussing duties of Court of First Instance). The Court of First
Instance has jurisdiction over certain types of cases, including non-contractual liability
of the European Community, staff cases, coal and steel cases, competition cases, and
related damages cases. Id.
127. See Stewart, supra note 72, at 42 (discussing ECJ jurisdiction).
128. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689; see Carl Otto Lenz
& Gerhard Grill, The Preliminary Ruling Procedure and the United Kingdom 19 FORDHAM
INr'L L.J. 844, 845-848 (analyzing preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177); see
also EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 164-88, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684-93 (setting forth
powers and composition of ECJ). EC Treaty Article 177 states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings con-
cerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member-
state, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgement, request the Court ofJustice to give
a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court of tribunal
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activities, their interpretation and application of EC Treaty pro-
visions," and statutes established by acts of the Council, com-
port with provisions of EC law.'1 0 When EC law confers rights on
its Member States, such rights become part of EC and Member
States' legal heritage and culture.131
The ECJ may review acts of the Council, Parliament, and the
Commission, and declare them illegal on grounds of lack of
competence, infringement of an essential procedural require-
ment, infringement of the TEU or any rule of law relating to its
application, or misuse of powers. 132 The ECJ also addresses
cases in which a Member State has brought an action against
or a member-state, against whose decisions there is not judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
Id. art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
129. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 180. In order to become an element of a
Member States' legal order, Community law that is considered directly applicable does
not need to be incorporated into domestic legislation. Id.
A provision of Community law will be considered directly applicable within the
domestic legal order if it becomes an element of that order without need of
any formal "incorporation" into Member State law .... The term directly
applicable, as used in this sense, has an obvious affinity with the more conven-
tional international law term "self-executing."
Id. A Community law has direct effect if it creates rights for not only Member States,
but also for private parties. Id. at 181.
130. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686.
131. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 665; Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.R. 1,
12.
132. TEU, supra note 8, art. 173, OJ. C 224/1, at 62 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
687-88. Article 173 states:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the
European Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commis-
sion and of the ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts
of the European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third
parties.
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member
State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, in-
fringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this
Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
The Court shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions
brought by the European Parliament and by the ECB for the purpose of pro-
tecting their prerogatives.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute pro-
ceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision
which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another
person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
The proceedings provided for in that Article shall be instituted within two
months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff,
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another Member State for infringement of EC Treaty obliga-
tions.13 3  Additionally, the ECJ may hear actions brought by
Member States or other EC institutions against the Commission
or Council for failure to act, when such action is necessary under
the EC Treaty.13 4 Judgments of the ECJ are binding on all par-
ties. '3 5
e. The ECJ's Relationship with Member States
Legal scholars have noted the importance of the relation-
ship between the courts of the Member States and the ECJ,' 36
because Member States implement much of EC law.' 3 7 When a
new Member State accedes to the European Community, it inte-
grates EC law into its national legal system, and is bound, by de-
fault, to apply EC law.' 38 Although EC law is supreme over na-
tional law,' 39 the European Community is a system of limited
or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of
the latter, as the case may be.
Id.
133. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 170, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686.
134. Id. art. 175, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 688.
135. Id. arts. 165-87, [1992) 1 C.M.L.R. at 684-91. In particular, Article 187 states,
"[t]hejudgments of the Court ofJustice shall be enforceable under the conditions laid
down in Article 192." Id. art. 187, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 691; see id. art. 164, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 684 (stating European Court of Justice ("ECJ") is highest authority on in-
terpretation of Community Law).
136. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 166-97 (examining relationship between
Member States and European Community).
137. See id. at 166 (stating that Member States implement EC law); JURGEN
ScHWARZE, THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
UNIFORM LAW AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1988) (dis-
cussing issues of ECJ jurisdiction, interpretation, and sovereignty); J.H.H. Weiler &
Ulrich F_ Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: Through the Looking Glass,
37 HAav. INT'L L.J. 411, 412 (1996) (stating that decisive question is evolving relation-
ship between Community law and Member State law); J.H.H. Weiler et al., European
Democracy and Its Critique, W. WUR. POuTICS, July 1995, at 4.
138. Stewart, supra note 72, at 41 (relying on ECJ case Costar v. ENEL, [1964]
E.C.R. 585).
139. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 171, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687 (requiring that
Member States obey rulings of ECJ). Article 171 states:
1. If the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil an
obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be required to take the necessary
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice.
2. If the Commission considers that the Member State concerned has not
taken such measures it shall, after giving that State the opportunity to submit
its observations, issue a reasoned opinion specifying the points on which the
Member State concerned has not complied with the judgment of the Court of
Justice.
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competences. 140 Member States approved the transfer of com-
petences to a central institution. 41 An array of specific and de-
tailed competences, however, limit this transfer of compe-
tences. 14 2
The ECJ generally decides the validity and the interpreta-
tion of EC laws. 143 Other duties, such as the institution and ap-
plication of such laws, are left to the Member States' courts. 44
If the Member State concerned fails to take the necessary measures to comply
with the Court's judgment within the time-limit laid down by the Commission,
the latter may bring the case before the Court of Justice. In so doing it shall
specify the amount of the lump sun or penalty payment to be paid by the
Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
If the Court of Justice finds that the Member State concerned has not com-
plied with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it.
This procedure shall be without prejudice to Article 170.
Id. "National law may not permit what is prohibited by EU law. To this degree, EU law
is supreme." Paul H. Vishny et al., European Union Law: An Introduction, in AMERICAN
LAW INSTrrUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 1, 12
(1996).
140. See Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange, Alegra v. Common Assembly of
the European Coal and Steel Community, Joined Cases 7/56 & 3-7/57, [1957] E.C.R.
39, at 82.
The Treaty is based upon delegation, with the consent of the Member States,
of sovereignty to supranational institutions for a strictly defined purpose...
The legal principle underlying the Treaty is a principle of limited authority.
The Community is a legal person governed by public law, and as such, it shall
enjoy the legal capacity it requires to perform its functions and attain its objec-
tives, but only that capacity ....
Id.
141. Dr. Ranier Arnold, The Treaty on European Union and German Constitutional
Law: The German Constitutional Court's Decision of Oct. 12, 1993, on the Treaty of Maastricht,
9 TUL. EUR. & Cr.. L.F. 91, 120 (1994).
142. Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 150.
The list of enumerated competences under the EEC Treaty begins with Article
169, authorizing the ECJ to hear cases brought by the Commission against
Member States in breach of their Community obligations. Article 170 grants
the ECJ the power to hear complaints by one Member State against another.
Article 173 allows the ECJ to hear actions for annulment of legal acts issued by
the Council or the Commission. The first paragraph of Article 173 gives
standing to the Council, the Commission, and the Member States and estab-
lishes jurisdiction over actions brought by these parties.
Id. (citations omitted).
143. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 169-70, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686-87 (explain-
ing ECJjurisdiction over Member States or Commission in case of Member State's non-
compliance with EC Treaty measures).
144. Id.; id. art. 171, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689. Article 171 of the TEU states that
Member States shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply with the
obligations provided for by the TEU and with the judgments of the ECJ. Id.; see id. art.
169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686 (stating ECJ has interpreted TEU Article 169 to state that
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In this way, Member State courts may impact EC law.' 45 A mea-
sure can be challenged based on differing interpretations of EC
law, on ultra vires grounds, or as beyond the powers that the EC
Treaty confers upon the European Community.'46
The decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court'4 7
in Solange P14 demonstrated that when the legality of a Commu-
nity measure is challenged, 49 the question of which institution
ultimately decides the issue carries important jurisdictional and
political implications.'5 0 This decision also displays the tension
between the court systems of the Member States and that of the
European Community.'51 In Solange I, the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court challenged the TEU, holding that in the case of
such a dispute, it has the final word rather than the ECJ,' 2 and
Commission can bring action against Member State for failure to enforce or legislate
law of European Community). Article 169 states:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obliga-
tion under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after
giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period
laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.
Id.
145. See Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 626-32 (describing interaction of ECJ and Member
States' courts).
146. See Weiler & Haltern, supra note 137, at 413 (describing how to bring chal-
lenges to Community law).
147. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 627-28. "The German Constitutional Court is com-
posed of two Senates, which are chambers of eightjudges deciding independently from
each other." Id. at 628 n.20.
148. Judgment of May 29, 1974, Case 2 BvL 52/71, 37 BVerfGE 271, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 540 [hereinafter Solange I].
149. Weiler & Haltern, supra note 137, at 413.
150. See id. (stating thatjurisdictional limits in Community Treaties are notoriously
difficult to identify with precision, therefore, question of who gets to decide is of great
political importance for relationship between the Community and Member States).
The answer to this jurisdictional question raises an issue of Community law in an inter-
national or constitutional light. See id. at 411-13 (critiquing theory expressed in Theo-
dor Schilling, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order - An Analysis of Possible Founda-
tions, 37 HAav. INT'L L.J. 389 (1996)). The TEU faced hurdles on the path to ratifica-
tion. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 14. Denmark ratified the TEU narrowly in a
second referendum in May 1993. Id. In France, public opinion was also divided regard-
ing ratification, and the United Kingdom withheld ratification until August 2, 1993. Id.
A legal challenge to ratification was brought in the German Constitutional Court,
claiming that the TEU would alter Germany's constitutional structure. Id.
151. See Weiler & Haltern, supra note 137, at 448 n.12 ("This is the consequence of
the German system of centralized judicial review, with the Bundesverfassungsgericht at
its core.").
152. Id.; see Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 627-28 (explaining struggle between ECJ and
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that the German Constitutional Court, rather than the ECJ, con-
trols any power exerted on German land.'5" The Solange I hold-
ing suggests a situation in which Member State courts do not
agree on an interpretation of EC law and apply varying forms of
a directive,' thus jeopardizing the legal consistency which the
European Community requires.
5 1
4. The Challenge of European Community Enlargement
One of the greatest challenges facing the European Com-
munity is that of enlargement through the accession of new
Member States. '56 This is especially true considering Parlia-
ment's leap forward towards European unity during the
1980s,' 57 and the decision to include nations of Central and East-
ern Europe in the European Community.15 8 European Commu-
nity expansion implicates civil and political rights, in addition to
German Constitutional Court, and tracing its decisions in area of fundamental rights
from Solange I to Solange I. A recent decision of the ECJ, however, held that it is its job
to review EC and Member State actions, and determine whether they are in accord with
the Treaty. Id. at 630, n.30 (citing Port v. Bundesanstalt fOr Landwirtschaft und
Brahrung, Case C 68/95 (Eur. Ct.J. Nov. 26, 1996) (not yet reported)).
153. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 4.
154. See Stewart, supra note 72, at 48-49 (discussing Regina v. Secretary for Transport,
ex parts Factome, in which allegation was discrimination based on nationality in violation
of free movement of persons and services in Community).
155. Id. at 49. Movement towards greater harmonization of laws and procedures
would lead to greater consistency and efficiency of the Community as a whole. Id.
156. See O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 33-34 (discussing formal agreement process un-
dertaken prior to membership of states applying for EC membership). "The difficulties
which will be caused by enlarging the Community/Union were brought into stark relief
in 1994, after the negotiations for accession to the Union of Austria, Finland, Norway
and Sweden had been concluded." Id. at 35. A Europe Agreement, which aims to
contribute to the development of the associated countries with a view to their possible
accession, was drafted with the Czech and Slovak Republics on June 23, 1993. 26 EC.
BULL., no. 6, point 1.3.17-18 (1993). A Europe Agreement with Romania was adopted
on December 21, 1992.25 EC. BULL., no. 12, point 1.4.14 (1993). A Europe Agreement
was executed with Bulgaria on December 22, 1992. 25 EC. BULL., no. 12, point 1.4.11-12
(1992). The Community has also entered into 10 year agreements with the Baltic states
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, by which it intends to develop trade and commercial
links with these potential Member States. Id.; see WESTLAKE, supra note 2, at 390 (listing
nations that have applied for membership in EU or have entered into agreements with
EU).
157. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 12 (discussing European Parliament's sup-
port of European unity during 1980s); see COMMUNrrY METHODS, supra note 17, at 24-36
(analyzing increased strains on human rights due to integration process).
158. See O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 31 (discussing effects of admission of new states
to European Community); see supra note 319 (discussing issues presented by European
growth).
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economic and social rights. 159 As a result, legislation has in-
creased as a fully integrated Europe moves closer to reality, and
most infringements involve differences in interpretation be-
tween the Commission and Member States, rather than deliber-
ate attempts to evade the EC Treaty rules.1 6°
Despite obstacles, the European Community has decided on
expansion.' 61 The decision to broaden and deepen162 the Euro-
pean Community involves the removal of institutional barriers16
and, therefore, the corresponding need for international coop-
eration to diminish newly created opportunities for violating
criminal and civil human rights has arisen.'6 4 The broadening
and widening of Europe raises not only national sovereignty is-
sues, but also is accompanied by individuals' apprehensions
about personal autonomy. 6 Greater freedom of movement be-
tween countries may cause social resentment, nationality dis-
crimination, racism, and xenophobia.16 6 This is largely because
159. Dominick, supra note 3, at 668; see DAVIS, supra note 60, at 295 (stating that
European Union has encompassed more than just economic regulation).
The founders realized political constraints existed which would not allow com-
plete integration to be achieved by one agreement at one point in time.
Therefore, it has developed slowly, integrating the diverse Members States first
economically and now politically. This framework under which the Member
States have been brought together represents what has been called a constitu-
tional order.
Id. (citation omitted); Noel, supra note 39, at 525-26 (noting increase in EC legislation
due to different interpretations of Community law).
160. Noel, supra note 39, at 525-26.
161. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 34. The consideration of new Member States in the
European Union has led to major upheavals in the EU framework and its institutions'
responsibilities. Id.; see id. at 35-36 (discussing difficulty in adjusting Council member-
ship and weighted voting in light of increased Community membership).
162. Id. at 34. "The debate on 'broadening and deepening' the Community turns
on two issues: expanding the membership of the Community and increasing the Com-
munity's competences." Id. In its opinions on the application for accession of Cyprus
and Malta, the European Commission similarly recognized that the continued growth
of the European Community will have important institutional consequences, such as
the need to allocate representation to accommodate EC participation. BORCHARDT,
supra note 9, at 66.
163. Id.
164. Francis R. Monaco, Europol: The Culmination of the European Union's Interna-
tional Police Cooperation Efforts, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 247, 247-48 (1995).
165. See COMMUNITY METHODS, supra note 17, at 2 (discussing EC growth issues).
166. Id. at 3. "The European Council in Rome also saw it as a task of the future
political union to fight against racism and xenophobia." TONY VENABLES, CURRENT EC
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS - AMENDMENT OF THE TREATIES 28 (1992) (citing Conclusion by
Presidency, 8N424/2/90, at 3).
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of EC movement toward the abolition of frontiers and the pro-
motion of a single European Union citizenship. 167 European
Union citizenship is based on the premise that every person who
holds the nationality of a Member State shall be considered a
citizen of the European Union, and that other Member States
must respect such status.'68 Additionally, the successful achieve-
ment of EU citizenship is dependent upon Member States' mu-
tual recognition and acceptance of each others' provisions and
criteria for the acquisition of state nationality. 69 Paradoxically,
there is no EC definition of nationality to facilitate acceptance
and agreement among Member States, but, rather, each Mem-
ber State determines the way in which national citizenship is
gained and lost.170
European growth raises at least two issues regarding the ex-
pansion of the European Community, namely, the changes in-
herently necessary in its make-up 171 and the need for increased
competence of EC institutions to accommodate more Member
States. 72 The question of how the EC institutional make-up will
have to change has not been unanswered. 17 The necessary allo-
cations of duties and representation among EC institutions will
be made as new nations are admitted to the European Commu-
nity.1 74
B. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
The ECHR was established on September 3, 1953, and is
composed of the Commission of Human Rights, the CHR, and
the Committee of Minsters of the Council of Europe ("Commu-
nity of Ministers") . 7  The ECHR provides rights and proce-
167. COMMUNITY METHODS, supra note 17, at 8.
168. VENABLES, supra note 166, at 29 (citing Article 8(1) of EC Treaty).
169. Id.
170. DOMiNIK LASOK & PETER A. STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY 32 (1987).
171. See Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 269-70, § I, 2-6 (suggesting that
continued growth of European Community and accession to ECHR would have impor-
tant institutional consequences).
172. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 34.
173. Id.
174. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 269-70, § 1, 6. Accession to the ECHR
itself would raise institutional questions. Id.
175. CASTBERG, supra note 11, at 14, 16.
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dures for the protection of human rights to anyone within the
jurisdiction of its contracting parties.1 76 The European Commu-
nity, however, while not a contracting party, refers to ECHR pro-
visions in its treaties.
1. Founding of the ECHR
The Council of Europe created the ECHR to promote
greater cooperation and understanding of common human
rights between European states, in an attempt to avoid a repeti-
tion of the international tensions that led to World War 11.177 In
its Message to Europeans, the Council of Europe pledged a
Charter of Human Rights, guaranteeing liberty of thought, as-
sembly, and expression, the right to form a political opposition,
a Court of Justice with adequate authority to enforce the Char-
ter, and an expectation of human values and human liberty in
Europe. 178 On July 12, 1949, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe received a draft of the ECHR.179 The draft
176. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246. Article 45 states, "[t]he
jurisdiction of the court shall extend to all cases concerning the interpretation and
application of the present Convention which the High Contracting Parties or the Com-
mission shall refer to it in accordance with Article 48." Id.
177. lAIN CAMERON & MAJA KIRILOVA ERIKSSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EURO-
PEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (1993). The devastation of World War II was
also a driving force in European integration. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 5.
Only after Europe had yet again been devastated by war was the disastrous
futility of constant national rivalry truly appreciated. Europe's total collapse
and the political and economic disintegration of outdated national structures
set the stage for a completely fresh start and called for a far more radical
approach to the reordering of Europe.
Id. The concerns left over after World War II left its mark on the treaties establishing
the European Communities, namely, to preserve and strengthen peace, to achieve eco-
nomic integration, to work towards political union, and to strengthen and promote
social cohesion within the Union. Id. at 23; Minutes of the Congress of Europe, con-
vened by the International Committee of Movements for European Unity from May 8-
10, 1948 (on file with Fordham International LawJournal) (stating that forces underlying
formation of European Community and ECHR are similar).
178. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT AND PROTOCOL No. 11 TO THE
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, RE-
STRUCTURING THE CONTROL MACHINERY ESTABLISHED THEREBY, 33 LL.M. 943, 94546
(American Soc'y of Int'l Law ed., 1994) [hereinafter COUNCIL OF EUROPE REPORT].
179. See id., at 946; CASTBERG, supra note 11, at 16. It is noteworthy that the Com-
mittee of Ministers also has duties conferred upon it by the Council of Europe. Id. at
17. These duties "are completely independent of its function under the Convention on
Human Rights." Id. The provisions of the ECHR do not affect the powers of the Com-
mittee of Ministers under the Statute of the Council of Europe. Id.; ECHR, supra note
11, art. 32, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating, in part, ECHR duties of Council of Ministers).
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set forth a minimum standard of human rights that the con-
tracting parties must protect, and established a system for legal
remedy and for their enforcement, empowering the institutions
that the ECHR established to condemn infringements of human
rights."s At that time, there was no significant division among
the nations of Europe regarding the necessity for such a conven-
tion, and the ultimate result of the July 12 draft was the tripar-
tite181 structure that forms and supports the ECHR, established
on September 3, 1953.182
2. ECHR Protections
The ECHR does not require that individual states incorpo-
rate its provisions into national law.1 83 It does mandate, how-
ever, that each contracting party ensure compliance with its pro-
visions. 84 Many of the ECHR's contracting parties have not ex-
pressly incorporated the ECHR into national legislation, but
they recognize the right of an individual to petition the Commis-
sion of Human Rights and are subject to its jurisdiction.'8 5 A
contracting party must accept an individual's right to petition
and directly invoke provisions of the ECHR.18 6 Among the
rights the ECHR guarantees are civil and political rights, such as
the rights to life, liberty, and security.1 8 7 It also protects citizens
against inhuman or degrading treatment, slavery, forced labor,
and servitude, and guarantees citizens a fair trial, freedom of
speech, and freedom of assembly.' The purpose of the ECHR
is to provide signatory parties and individual citizens with a
supra-national legal order, against which national legislation and
its compatibility with ECHR principles are tested.18 9
180. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 7.
181. COUNCIL OF EUROPE REPORT, supra note 178, at 946.
182. ECHR, supra note 11, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
183. FAWCETT, supra note 74, at 4.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 6.
187. PETER WESSMAN, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAw 2-3 (1992).
188. Id. at 3; see FAWCE-r, supra note 74 (outlining protections provided by
ECHR).
189. WzssMAN, supra note 187, at 2.
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3. ECHR Bodies
The tripartite structure of the ECHR consists of the Com-
mission of Human Rights, the CHR, and the Committee of Min-
isters. 9 ' The Commission on Human Rights considers the ad-
missibility of petitions, establishes facts, promotes friendly settle-
ments, and, if necessary, delivers opinions regarding whether
violations of human rights have occurred. 9' The CHR gives a
final and binding judgment on cases that the Commission of
Human Rights or a contracting party referred to it. 19 2 The Com-
mittee of Ministers renders a final and binding decision on cases
that cannot be referred or are not referred to the CHR. 193
a. The Commission of Human Rights
The Commission of Human Rights is a body of inquiry with
advisory and mediary functions.194 Its task is to protect the com-
mon interest of all members of the Council of Europe'95 in the
enforcement of ECHR provisions. 196 It assists parties in reaching
friendly settlements, draws up reports describing agreements
reached or not reached, and issues opinions on whether the par-
ties violated the agreements.9 7 Application to the Commission
190. CASTBERG, supra note 11, at 14, 16.
191. FAWCETT, supra note 74, at 258-59. The duty of the Commission on Human
Rights has been compared to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the United
Kingdom. Id. at 263. The Judicial Committee has the task of maintaining standards of
justice in the courts within its jurisdiction, not of a revising court of criminal appeal. Id.
The reports of the Commission on Human Rights to the Committee of Ministers is an
opinion and not binding law that the Council is bound to accept. Id. at 264.
192. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 52, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248. Article 52 states that "[t]he
judgment of the court shall be final." Id.
193. See CASrBERG, supra note 11, at 16 (defining Committee of Ministers).
194. Id. at 20-23 (describing functions and procedures of Commission on Human
Rights).
195. See FAWCETr, supra note 74, at 271 (noting that some scholars have consid-
ered ECHR to be organ of Council of Europe). The Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe elect the members of the ECHR, and the Council of Europe and its
secretariat bear the expenses of the ECHR. Id. (referencing Report of Committee of
Experts, Mar. 16, 1950) (stating "it does seem in fact advisable to attach the Commis-
sion from an administrative point of view, to the Council of Europe," and demonstrat-
ing early connection between Convention and European Community).
196. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234. Article 19 provides, "[t]o
ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties
in the present Convention, there shall be set up: (1) A European Commission of
Human Rights hereinafter referred to as the 'Commission'; (2) A European Court of
Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as 'the Court'." Id.
197. Id. art. 31, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240. Article 31 states:
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of Human Rights does not have any effect on a Member State's
ability to take alternative action through its own judicial or legis-
lative system. 198
The Commission of Human Rights is not a supreme body
that examines alleged errors of law or fact committed by the do-
mestic courts of the contracting parties acting wholly within
their own jurisdiction. 99 It instead ensures observance of the
contracting parties' obligations and ensures compliance with the
ECHR. °° The Commission of Human Rights receives applica-
tions from contracting parties"°' or individuals 0 and examines
1. If a solution is not reached, the Commission shall draw up a Report on the
facts and state its opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by
the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention. The opinions of
all the members of the Commission on this point may be stated in the Report.
2. The Report shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers. It shall also
be transmitted to the States concerned, who shall not be at liberty to publish
it.
3. In transmitting the Report to the Committee of Ministers the Commission
may make such proposals as it thinks fit.
Id.
198. 297/57: 2 Yearbook 212; 1420/62: 6 Yearbook 590, 626.
199. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234; see supra note 196 (quoting
ECHR Article 19).
200. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234.
201. Id. art. 24, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236. Article 24 states, "[a]ny High Contracting
Party may refer to the Commission, through the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe, any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention by another High Con-
tracting Party." Id.
202. Id. art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38. Article 25 states:
(1) The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmen-
tal organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation
by one of the High contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Conven-
tion, provided that the High contracting Party against which the complaint
has been lodged has declared that it recognizes the competence of the Com-
mission to receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting Parties who
have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any way the effective
exercise of this right.
(2) Such declarations may be made for a specific period.
(3) The declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe who shall transmit copies thereof to the High contracting
Parties and publish them.
(4) The Commission shall only exercise the powers provided for in this Arti-
cle when at least six High Contracting Parties are bound by declarations made
in accordance with the preceding paragraphs.
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the parties and the merits of applications. °3 The Commission of
Human Rights acts on such applications as provided in Article
57 of the ECHR °4 and cannot itself initiate proceedings or in-
quire into the conditions of the application of the ECHR in a
contracting state.205 Before the Commission of Human Rights
can even consider an application, it must demonstrate jurisdic-
tion by determining that the complaining party has exhausted
all local remedies.20°  The relation of the Commission on
Human Rights to national courts depends on whether the proce-
dure for application to the Commission of Human Rights can
exclude the invocation of provisions of the ECHR before na-
tional courts, and how far the Commission of Human Rights can
scrutinize and control the decisions of national courts. 0 7
b. The Court of Human Rights
The Council of Europe determines the composition of the
CHR.2 0 8 Its powers are limited to determining whether the con-
tracting parties have committed a substantive or procedural
abuse of ECHR provisions.2°  CHRjurisdiction reaches all cases
203. Id. art. 24-25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38; see supra note 201 (quoting text of Arti-
cle 24).
204. See ECHR, supra note 11, art. 57, 213 U.N.T.S. at 250 (as amended by Proto-
cols Nos. 3, 5, and 8, which entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, and
January 1, 1990 respectively). Article 57 provides, "[o]n receipt of a request from the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe any High Contracting Party shall furnish an
explanation of the manner in which its internal law ensures the effective implementa-
tion of any of the provisions of this Convention." Id.
205. See, FAwcE-r, supra note 74, at 267.
206. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 26, 213 U.N.T.S. at 238. Article 26 states that "[t]he
Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law, and within a
period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken." Id.
207. See FAWCETr, supra note 74, at 267.
208. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 39, 213 U.N.T.S. at 242-44. Article 39 states:
(1) The members of the court shall be elected by the Consultative Assembly
by a majority of the votes cast from a list of persons nominated by the Mem-
bers of the Council of Europe; each Member shall nominate three candidates,
of whom two at least shall be its nationals.
(2) As far as applicable, the same procedure shall be followed to complete the
Court in the event of the admission of new Members of the council of Europe,
and in filling casual vacancies.
(3) The candidates shall be of high moral character and must either possess
the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be juris-
consults of recognized competence.
Id.
209. Id. art. 54, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248. Article 54 states, "[t]hejudgment of the court
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that involve the ECHR's application and interpretation by the
contracting parties. 1 °
1. CHR Composition
The judges of the CHR are elected from a list of persons
nominated by the Members of the Council of Europe2 11 for a
term of nine years.2 12 The CHR elects a president and vice-presi-
dent for terms of three years each.213 The number of judges sit-
ting on the CHR corresponds with the number of contracting
parties in the Council of Europe.2 1 4 The Committee of Ministers
supervises the execution of CHR judgments. 21 5
2. Powers of the CHR
The CHR can determine only whether the domestic courts
of contracting parties have committed an abuse or procedural
irregularity, and only the contracting parties and the Commis-
sion on Human Rights may bring a case before the CHR. 16
shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers which shall supervise its execution."
Id.
210. Id. art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246; see supra note 176 (citing text of Article 45).
211. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 39, 213 U.N.T.S. at 242-44; see supra note ???? (cit-
ing text of Article 39).
212. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 40, 213 U.N.T.S. at 244. Article 40 states:
(1) The members of the Court shall be elected for a period of nine years.
They may be re-elected. However, of the members elected at the first election
the terms of four members shall expire at the end of six years.
(2) The members whose terms are to expire at the end of the initial periods
of three and six years shall be chosen by lot by the Secretary-General immedi-
ately after the first election has been completed.
(3) A member of the Court elected to replace a member whose term of office
has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of his predecessor's term.
(4) The members of the Court shall hold office until replaced. After having
been replaced, they shall continue to deal with such cases as they already have
under consideration.
Id.
213. Id. art. 41, 213 U.N.T.S. at 244. Article 41 states, "[tihe Court shall elect its
President and Vice-President for a period of three years. They may be re-elected." Id.
214. Id. art. 38, 213 U.N.T.S. at 242. Article 38 states, "[t]he European court of
Human Rights shall consist of a number ofjudges equal to that of the Members of the
Council of Europe. No two judges may be nationals of the same State." Id.
215. Id. art. 54, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248.
216. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 44, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246. Article 44 states, "[o]nly
the High Contracting Parties and the Commission shall have the right to bring a case
before the Court." Id. An individual cannot bring a case before the CHR, nor can an
individual be a respondent there. FAWCETr, supra note 74, at 330. The method for
dealing with such a situation is the Report of the Commission and observations made to
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Before a petition applying for judgment by the CHR is admissi-
ble, all internal remedies, including bringing an action in the EC
internal courts, and particularly the ECJ, must first have been
exhausted.2 17 Additionally, the CHR has the power to decide an
issue only if the contracting parties cannot reach a friendly set-
tlement within three months. 218 The CHR is unable to repeal or
amend a provision of national law.21 9
the CHR, orally or in writing, by delegates of the Commission on Human Rights. Id.
Article 48 of the ECHR states:
The following may bring a case before the Court, provided that the High
Contracting Party concerned, if there is only one, or the High Contracting
Parties concerned, if there is more than one, are subject to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court or, failing that, with the consent of the High Con-
tracting Party concerned, if there is only one, or of the High Contracting Party
concerned if there is more that one:
(a) the Commission;
(b) a High Contracting Party whose national is alleged to be a victim
(c) a High Contracting Party which referred the case to the Commission;
(d) a High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged.
ECHR, supra note 11, art. 48, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
217. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 270-71, § I, 10; see ECHR, supra note 11,
art. 26, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38; supra note 206 (limiting circumstances under which
ECHR may review petition).
218. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 47, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246. Article 47 states, "[t]he
Court may only deal with a case after the Commission has acknowledged the failure of
efforts for a friendly settlement and within the period of three months provided for in
Article 32." Id. Article 32 states:
(1) If the question is not referred to the Court in accordance with Article 48
of this Convention within a period of three months from the date of the trans-
mission of the Report to the Committee of Ministers, the Committee of Minis-
ters shall decide by a majority of two-thirds of the members entitled to sit on
the committee whether there has been a violation of the Convention.
(2) In the affirmative case the Committee of Ministers shall prescribe a period
during which the High Contracting Party concerned must take the measures
required by the decision of the Committee of Ministers.
(3) If the High Contracting Party concerned has not taken satisfactory meas-
ures within the prescribed period, the committee of Ministers shall decide by
the majority provided for in paragraph (1) above what effect shall be given to
its original decision and shall publish the Report.
(4) The High Contracting Parties undertake to regard as binding on them
any decision which the committee of Ministers may take in application of the
preceding paragraphs.
Id. art. 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240-42.
219. See UN: Massive Refugee Flows to Rwanda Would Not End Region's Human Rights
Problems Norway Tells Third Committee, Nov. 26, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL
13552936, [hereinafter Refugee]. "Human rights and fundamental freedoms [are] ina-
lienable for rich and poor alike, and they [are] the only sure foundation for stability
and long-term economic development." Id.
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3. Jurisdiction
The CHR has jurisdiction over all cases that concern the in-
terpretation and application of the ECHR by the high con-
tracting parties.220 The CHR determines whether it has jurisdic-
tion.221 In a case in which provisions of the ECHR completely or
partially differ from the constitutional law of the high con-
tracting parties, the ECHR provisions suggest that it overrides
national legislation.22 The assumption is that internal law of a
contracting party will conform to the requirements of the
ECHR.221 The CHR may hear cases brought to it by individuals,
victim applicants,2 24 contracting parties,2 2 5 or the Commis-
sion.226 The judgment of the CHR is final,22 7 excluding the pos-
sibility of interpretative or revisionary proceedings conducted at
220. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246; see supra note 176 and
accompanying text (citing text of article 45).
221. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 49, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248, art. 49. Article 49 states,
"[iln the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be
settled by the decision of the Court." Id.
222. Id. art. 50, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248. Article 50 states, "if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this deci-
sion or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party." Id.
223. CASTBERG, supra note 11, at 14.
224. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. 236-38. Article 25 states:
(1) The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary-General
of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organization or
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that
the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has
declared that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive such
petitions. Those of the High contracting Parties who have made such a decla-
ration undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.
(2) Such declarations may be made for a specific period.
(3) The declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
council of Europe who shall transmit copies thereof to the High Contracting
Parties and publish them.
(4) The Commission shall only exercise the powers provided for in this Arti-
cle when at least six High Contracting Parties are bound by declarations made
in accordance with the preceding paragraphs.
Id.
225. Id. art. 24, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236. Article 24 states, "[a]ny High Contracting
Party may refer to the Commission, through the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe, any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention by another High Con-
tracting Party." Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. art. 52, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248; see supra note 192 (quoting text of ECHR
Article 52).
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the request of a high contracting party or the Commission on
Human Rights. 22
8
c. Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each of the contracting
parties make up the Committee of Ministers. 2 9 The Committee
of Ministers receives a report from the Commission on Human
Rights regarding potential violations.23 ° If an alleged violation is
not referred to the CHR within three months, the Committee of
Ministers decides whether there has been a violation of the
ECHR. 31 If a binding decision is reached,3 2 the Committee of
Ministers will designate a time period during which the con-
tracting party must attempt to correct the violation by taking
measures set out by the decision of the Committee of Minis-
ters.23 3 If the contracting party does not satisfactorily take such
measures, the Committee of Ministers will decide by two-thirds
majority what effect will be given to its original decision.2 4 If
the case is not brought before the ECJ, the Committee of Minis-
ters must also publish the Commission of Human Rights' Re-
port.235
228. FAWcE-r, supra note 74, at 336.
229. CAsMrERG, supra note 11, at 16. These duties "are completely independent of
its function under the Convention on Human Rights." Id. at 17. The provisions of the
ECHR do not affect the powers of the Committee of Ministers under the Statute of the
Council of Europe. Id.
230. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 31, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240. Article 31 states:
(1) If a solution is not reached, the Commission shall draw up a report on the
facts and state its opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by
the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention. The opinions of
all the members of the Commission on this point may be stated in the Report.
(2) The Report shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers. It shall
also be transmitted to the States concerned, who shall not be at liberty to pub-
lish it.
(3) In transmitting the Report to the Committee of Ministers the commission
may make such proposals as it thinks fit.
Id.
231. Id. art. 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240-42; see supra note 218 (quoting Article 32).
232. CAWBERG, supra note 11, at 16. "A majority of two-thirds of the members
entitled to sit on the Committee is required for a decision by the Committee of Minis-
ters to be binding." Id.
233. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 32(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 242.
234. Id. art. 32(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 240; see supra note 218 (quoting Article 32).
235. ECHR, supra note 11, 213 U.N.T.S. at 242, art. 32(3); CASTBERG, supra note
11, at 234.
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3. Relationship Between the European Community
and the ECHR
The present lack of enumerated human rights laws in the
European Community forces those Member States that have
chosen not to incorporate the ECHR into their national laws to
adhere to ECHR principles when applying any national law that
has its basis in EC law or that is affected by EC law.236 As EC law
now affects a large area of national law, this amounts to the in-
corporation of the ECHR through the "back door."23 7 In other
words, although the Member States' Constitutional Courts can-
not review EC acts, as this would constitute a lack of fidelity to
EC law,238 the nature of and questionable direct applicability
of23 9 EC measures arguably requires Member States to do just
this.2 '40 For example, if an ECHR signatory party, that is also a
Member State, fails to apply EC law, which relies on ECHR prin-
ciples, an individual may request a national court to make a re-
ferral to the ECJ.2 41 The ECJ interprets EC law as coexisting with
ECHR law and, thus, would be enforcing ECHR regulations de-
spite that the European Community never has explored and rati-
fied fully this intention. 42
C. Human Rights Protection in the European Community
The Community does not have a formal, written Bill of
Rights, nor it is a contracting party to the ECHR.2 " The ECJ
236. See Dominick, supra note 3, at 643 and n.14 (noting significance of 1974 deci-
sion Solange 4 of German Constitutional Court, which held that "'so long as' there ex-
isted neither a viable legislative power sufficient to balance the other Community or-
gans nor written catalogue of fundamental rights, German Basic Law would be consid-
ered superior to Community law."); see also Frontiti v. Ministero delle Finanze, Case
183/73, Giust. civ. 1974-Il, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372, 410 (holding that, absent constitu-
tional requirement to adhere to ECHR, national law of Italian Corte Costituzionale
prevails).
237. See Dominick, supra note 3, at 643; Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 143 (describ-
ing horizontal effect of directives by "back door").
238. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 635.
239. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8.
240. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693-94; supra note
91 (explaining application of EC laws).
241. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689; supra note 128
(quoting text of Article 177).
242. Solange 1, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 540.
243. BERANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
244. COMMUNrrY METHODS, supra note 17, at 12.
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has noted24 that the protection of human rights in the Euro-
pean Community mainly derives from different sources of law.246
This includes EC Treaty protections, natural law, Member States'
common constitutional laws,247 and international treaties and
conventions, such as the ECHR.2 48 The ECHR, however, is not
officially incorporated into the EC legal system.24 9
1. EC Treaty Protection
EC membership requires that a candidate country achieve
stability of democratic institutions, guarantee the existence of a
functioning market economy, and guarantee the protection of
respect for minorities.2 50 As the European Community is not a
Member of the ECHR, this third requirement does not expressly
include acceptance of the ECHR, which would impose minimum
standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms on Mem-
ber States. 5' General principles of EC law,252 therefore, provide
245. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
246. See VENABLES, supra note 166, at 27-36 (referencing confusing structure of
human rights protection in Community and noting parts of EC Treaty in which such
provisions are found). The need for specific Community powers in the field of human
rights, reaffirmed by case-law, is enshrined in Article F of the TEU. Opinion 2/94,
[1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 170, § I, 8.
247. Stauder v. City of Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, 424-25.
248. SEA, supra note 8, pmbl., O.J. L. 169/1, at 2 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 741.
The SEA Preamble states that the Community is "determined to work together to pro-
mote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions
and laws of the Member States, in the convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equal-
ity and social justice .... " Id.; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 145-49 (discussing
origins of fundamental rights protection in European Community).
249. COMMUNrTY METHODS, supra note 17, at 12.
250. SEA, supra note 8, pmbi., O.J. L 159, at 2, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 741; see supra
notes 248 (citing text of preamble); BERMANN ET AL., supra note 8, at 145-46 (discussing
origins of fundamental rights protection in European Community).
251. See CASTBERG, supra note 11, at 5 (stating "the direct purpose of the Conven-
tion is to safeguard certain 'minimum rights.' On the other [hand], the view has been
expressed . . . that the list of human rights to be protected by the Convention is not
complete . . . ."). The concept of Rechtsgemeinschaft, meaning a community of law, is
required as a condition of joining the Union. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 633-34. "In the
German version, the rule of law is called Rechtsstaatlichkeit, a notion derived from the
Rechtsstaat, the state of law. The Court ofJustice transformed this notion into Rechtsge-
meinschafl (community of law) enabling it to apply its meaning to the European Com-
munity." Id. (citing AECH, Les Verts v. European Parliament, Case No. 294/83, [1986]
E.C.R. 1339, 1365; repeated by ECJ, Opinion 1/91, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079, 1-6102). This
includes, however, accepting fundamental law, not accepting the ECHR and its princi-
ples. Id.
252. See WssMAN, supra note 187, at 14-15 (explaining definition of general princi-
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the foundation of human rights protection in the European
Community.2 5 3
The treaties establishing and regulating the European
Union do not make any exact references to specific fundamental
rights. 254 The clearest EC statement regarding fundamental
human rights is found in Article F(2) of the TEU2 5- which states
that the European Union shall respect the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the ECHR, those guaranteed by the Member
States' common constitutional traditions, and those guaranteed
by general principles of EC law. 56 Such reference, however,
does not provide that European citizens shall have the right to
invoke such rights against a state or institution for their viola-
pies of Community law, including its three categories, compelling legal principles, regu-
latory rules common to laws of Member States, and general rules that are native to
Community legal order). General principles of law is a doctrine developed by the ECJ,
which has:
[U]tilized general principles of law to cloak the nakedness ofjudicial law-mak-
ing: the idea is that if a ruling can be shown to be derived from a principle of
sufficient generality as to command common assent, a firm legal foundation
for the judgment will be provided. For this reason, the European Court has
developed a doctrine that rules of Community law may be derived, not only
from treaties and legislation, but also from the general principles of law.
Id. (citing T.C. HARTLv, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNrIY LAw 129 (2d ed.
1988)).
253. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.RI at 684. Article 164 states,
"[tihe Court ofJustice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this
Treaty the law is observed." Id.
254. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 272, § III, 1 1; see WEsSMAN, supra note
187, at 5.
It is generally accepted that the EEC Treaty does not contain any specific pro-
visions dealing with the protection of human rights. However, it cold be ar-
gued that at least two important provisions of the Treaty contribute to this
protection. These are the freedom of movement ... of workers, and the free-
dom from discrimination based on nationality and sex.
Id.
255. TEU, supra note 8, art. F, OJ. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728.
Article F of the TEU provides:
1. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States,
whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law.
3. The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objec-
tives and carry through its policies.
256. Id.
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tion, 57 nor does it provide for penalties for the violation of such
rights. At present, the requirement of a general respect for fun-
damental rights and freedoms, as stated in Article F(2), does not
impose any minimum standards on the European Community or
its institutions, other than confirming the Member States' attach-
ment to respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. 58
The EC Treaty, in its preamble, resolves to preserve and
strengthen peace and liberty in the European Community.259
This loose collection of laws260 has become the basis of the EC
civil and human rights law.2 6 1 Additionally, because the EC trea-
ties primarily address economic issues, fundamental rights pro-
tections covered tend to have more of an economic than a per-
sonal nature.262 Paradoxically, although the European Commu-
257. VENABL.S, supra note 166, at 29.
258. Id.
259. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 272, at § III, 1.
260. See SEA, supra note 8, pmbl., O.J. L 169/1, at 2 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at
741 (referring to fundamental rights recognized in laws of Member States, ECHR, and
European Social Charter, and stressing importance of fundamental rights in connec-
tion with democratic principles); TEU, supra note 8, art. F.2, O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728 (stating that European Union "shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention .. . and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Com-
munity law"); id. art. J.1(2), O.J. C 224/1 at 94 (referencing respect to human rights
and fundamental freedoms); id. art. K.2(1), O.J. C 224/1 at 97 (referencing compli-
ance with ECHR with respect to justice and home affairs); EC Treaty, supra note 8, art.
130u(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 672 (providing that Community policy in area of devel-
opment cooperation is to contribute to objective of respecting human rights and funda-
mental freedoms); see also Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R at 272, at § III, 11 2, 3 (stat-
ing "[t]he Court of Justice has upheld the protection of fundamental rights by way of
general principles of Community law, referring to common constitutional traditions
and to international instruments, in particular the Convention."); Id. at 273, § III, 5
(providing references to respect for fundamental rights and freedoms made in political
declarations by Member States and Community institutions).
261. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 3(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (stating aboli-
tion, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, serv-
ices, and capital); id. art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612 (stating freedom of movement
for workers shall be secured, along with abolition of discrimination based on nationality
between workers of Member States with regards to employment, remuneration, and
other conditions of employment, excluding application of Article 48 to employment in
public service); id. art. 52, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-14 (stating abolition of restrictions
on freedom of establishment of nationals of Member State, applying particularly to self-
employed persons); id. art. 53, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 614 (restricting Member States to
limit right of establishment); id. art. 59, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-17 (providing for
progressive abolition of restrictions of freedom to provide services within Community);
see also Opinion 2/94 [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 272-74, § III, 1-10 (noting separate loca-
tions from which Community human rights law is derived).
262. DINNAGE & MURPHY, supra note 28, at 335.
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nity has rights to place restrictions on its Member States and
demand that they work with the European Community to create
a Europe without internal frontiers, it has no responsibilities to
ensure that this is accomplished in accordance with the protec-
tion of human rights.263 This task is left to national and interna-
tional control organizations. 64
Since the 1970s, the EC institutions have increasingly fo-
cused on the importance of protecting the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of the people of the European Commu-
nity.261 The EC institutions issued a Joint Declaration 2 1 noting
EC commitment to the protection of fundamental rights, as de-
rived from the ECHR and the constitutions of the Member
States.2 67 The Joint Declaration, however, is not judicially bind-
ing.268 The ECHR's principles, therefore, do not bind the Euro-
pean Community.2 6
9
The most widely recognized and utilized remedy2 70 for pro-
tection of human rights against EC acts is found in Article 177 of
the EC Treaty, the preliminary rulings procedure.2 71 Also pro-
viding protection against human rights violations is Article
173,72 which gives individuals the right to bring an action
263. COMMUNry METHODS, supra note 17, at 8.
264. Id.
265. See Intergovernmental Conferences: Contributions by the Commission, 24 EC BuLL.
no. 2, at 75 (1991) (discussing Member States' emphasis on international scope of
human rights).
The 12 Member States have gradually come to accept the need for a
higher profile on the international scene to enable them to give a collective
response to a clear demand for Europe, to work together to defend their inter-
ests, and to contribute to the creation of a fairer, more efficient world order
which respects the values they share, in particular human rights.
Id.
266. TheJoint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Com-
mission, Apr. 5, 1979, O.J. C 103/1 (1979); see WEssMAN, supra note 187, at 6 (explain-
ing history and purpose ofJoint Declaration); id. at 62 (reproducing text ofJoint Decla-
ration).
267. SEA, supra note 8, pmbl., OJ. L 169/1, at 1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 741;
seesupra note 248 (stating content of preamble); BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 8, at 145-
46 (discussing origins of fundamental rights protection in European Community).
268. Id. at 146.
269. Id.
270. WEssMAN, supra note 187, at 24.
271. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689; see supra note
128 (quoting text of Article 177).
272. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 173, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687-88; see supra
note 132 (citing Article 173).
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before the ECJ for review of EC decisions, and Articles 178 and
215,2 which concern the liability of the European Community
to pay damages for the unlawful measures of its institutions.
The determination of whether a measure of EC institutions or
Member States is unlawful, however, is subject only to the vague
definition of general principles of EC law.
2 74
2. Member State Protection
The nature of EC law, which takes different forms and has
different effects on the Member State legal systems, complicates
the practical application in the Member States of EC Treaty ref-
erences to human rights.2 7 Much of EC law, for example, is in
the form of directives.2 76  A national court or administrative
agency must interpret and implement directives by national leg-
273. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 215, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 710. Article 215
states:
The contractual liability of the Community shall be governed by the law appli-
cable to the contract in question.
In the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance
with the general principles common to the laws of the Member-States, make
good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the perform-
ance of their duties.
The preceding paragraph shall apply under the same conditions to damage
caused by the ECB or by its servants in the performance of their duties.
The personal liability of its servants towards the Community shall be governed
by the provisions laid down in their Staff Regulations or in the Conditions of
Employment applicable to them.
Id.
274. WEssmAN, supra note 187, at 24. Other texts that deal with human rights and
the European Community include the European Council Declaration of European
Identity (1973), theJoint Declaration of Human Rights (1977), the European Council
Declaration on Democracy (1978), Parliamentary Resolution on the abolition of the
death penalty in the European Community (1981), theJoint Declaration against racism
and xenophobia (1986), Foreign Ministers' Statement on human rights (1986), Human
Dimension of the CSCE (1989), Parliamentary Resolution on the social dimension of
the internal market (1989), Parliamentary Resolution on the ethical and legal problems
of genetic engineering (1989), Parliamentary Resolution adopting the Declaration of
fundamental rights and freedoms (1989), European Convention on Transfrontier Tele-
vision (1989), Council Directive on Broadcasting (1989), Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (1989), Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (1989).
ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNnIy A CRrrICAL OvER.
VIEw, Vol. I, Annex 11 (1990).
275. Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 148-49. "[T]he ECJ emphasized [that] national
judges must always consider the characteristic features of Community law and the par-
ticular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise." Id.
276. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693; Stewart, supra
note 72, at 42; see supra note 92 (citing text of Article 189).
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islation, and apply national law consistent with the most closely
related EC directive. 277 As a general rule, however, directives do
not have direct horizontal effect.2 78 Directives are binding on
Member States as to the result, but Member States determine the
manner of its attainment. 279 This discretion gives rise to the
question of whether Member States that are also ECHR con-
tracting parties must observe the ECHR in their national law
provisions that implement its provisions, or merely reach a cer-
tain result.280  Recommendations and opinions, by way of con-
trast, are not binding.281 Regulations have the ultimate force of
law in Member States and impart obligations and confer rights
on Member States.282 Regulations have direct effect on subjects
of the European Community, and require no further implemen-
tation.283
The ECJ cannot review legislative provisions of Member
States for compliance with ECHR provisions, and it lacks the
power to review legislation concerning areas that fall within the
jurisdiction of national legislation, even if such legislation argua-
bly violates human rights.28 4 Member State national courts,
therefore, have great leeway in determining the human rights
protections of their citizens, because, in order to comply with EC
law, such laws must only comply with the vague standard of re-
spect for fundamental rights.
3. Case Law on Human Rights in the European Community
The EC institutions addressed the tension between the Eu-
ropean Community, the ECHR, and the sovereign states in the
area of human rights as far back as the 1960s when the ECJ ruled
on the compatibility of EC law with the human rights laws of the
277. Stewart, supra note 72, at 42
278. See Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 144 (noting distinction between vertical ef-
fect of directives that affects legal relationship between citizen and Member States, and
horizontal effect that affects relationship between private parties).
279. Id.; EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 189, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693; see supra note
92 (citing text of Article 189).
280. See Stewart, supra note 72, at 43 (giving example of possibility of different
results in Member States' courts).
281. See Noel, supra note 39, at 518-19 (describing effect of recommendations and
opinions on EC law).
282. See Stewart, supra note 72, at 42 (discussing effect of regulations on Member-
States).
283. Id.
284. COMMUNITY METHODS, supra note 17, at 15.
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German Constitution, the Grundgesetz. a5 Initially, the ECJ re-
fused to recognize human rights protections codified in the Ger-
man Constitution. 286 The German Constitutional Court subse-
quently held, in Solange I, that EC law did not bind the German
Constitutional Court in situations in which Community law
would violate German human rights laws. 8 7 In reaction to an
unfavorable appraisal of the new Community institutional struc-
ture, a democratic deficit in the treaties establishing and regulat-
ing the European Community, the absence of a Community cat-
alogne of fundamental rights, and the fear of a possible German
revolt,2"' the ECJ, in Stauder v. City of U/m, 289 recognized human
rights as a part of EC law.
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 291 the ECJ291 furthered
285. WESSMAN, supra note 187, at 25.
286. Stork v. High Authority, Case 1/58, [1959] E.C.R. 17; Geitling v. High Au-
thority, Case 49/59, [1960] E.C.R. 423.
287. Solange I, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 540. Similarly, the Italian Constitutional
Court, Corte Constitutzionale, in its ruling of December 27, 1973, held that if Community
law was interpreted as to violate fundamental human rights, the Constitutional Court
could consider whether Community law was compatible with such rights. WESSMAN,
supra note 187, at 37; Frontiti, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 372.
288. WESSMAN, supra note 187, at 26.
289. Stauder, [1969] E.C.R. 419, [1970] C.M.L.R. 112 (regarding compatibility of
EC decision that made sale of cheap butter under welfare provisions dependent on
revealing beneficiaries names to sellers with general principles of EC law).
290. Internationale Handelsgessllschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle ffir
degreesur Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R1 1125, 1135 [hereinaf-
ter Internationale Handelsgessllschaft] (holding that fundamental rights are guaran-
teed by Community's legal system). In that case, a German exporter challenged a
Council regulation, under German law, that made the grant of export licenses for cer-
tain products conditional on payment of a deposit, which would be forfeited if the
payment were not made. Id. at 1127. The ECJ held that:
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge
the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the community would
have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of community law. The
validity of such measures can only be judged in the light of Community law.
In fact, the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, can-
not because of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without
the legal basis of the community itself being called into question. Therefore
the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State can-
not be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights
as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national
constitutional structure.
However, an examination should be made as to whether or not any analo-
gous guarantee inherent in Community law has been disregarded. In fact,
respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles
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the recognition of fundamental rights in the European Commu-
nity and addressed the issue of whether the EC Member States,
the Council of Ministers, and the Commission must adhere to
ECHR principles when legislating and applying Community
law. 92 The ECJ held that EC law incorporates the principles of
the ECHR and, therefore, the EC institutions are required to fol-
low those principles. 293 In Nold K.G. v. Commission,2 94 the ECJ
again extended the scope of EC protection of human rights in
holding that the ECJ must draw its inspiration from common
constitutional traditions of Member States and utilize guidelines
provided by international treaties to which Member States are
signatories. 95
of law protected by the court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst
inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must
be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Com-
munity. It must therefore be ascertained, in the light of the doubts expressed
by the Verwaltungsgericht, whether the system of deposits has infringed rights
of a fundamental nature, respect for which must be ensured in the community
legal system.
Id. at 1134. The validity of Internationale Handelgeselschafl has been subsequently ques-
tioned by the ECJ in Bundesverfassungsgericht, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 531; see WEssMAN, supra
note 187, at 35 (discussing Intemationale Handelgesellschaft); see also Frontiti, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 372 (addressing similar issues regarding transfer of Member State power to
European Community, and positing that this transfer was not intended to confer on
European Community power to violate human rights).
291. CAMERON & EmRSSON, supra note 177, at 109.
292. Id.
293. Internationale HandelgessllUschaft, [1970] E.C.R. at 1125 (holding that ECHR is
incorporated into Community's legal system and, therefore, Member States must follow
ECHR principles); see Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child v. Grogan, [1991]
3 C.M.L.R. 849, 876-79, (holding that ECHR is part of general principles of EC law and
demonstrating intention to include human rights protection of ECHR in EC law).
294. Nold Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974]
E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 338 (regarding claim that EC decision violated human
rights because it infringed on right to free pursuit of business activity).
295. Id. at 507-08. Specifically, the ECJ stated:
As the Court has already stated, fundamental human rights form an integral
part of the general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures.
In safeguarding these rights, the court is bound to draw inspiration from con-
stitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore
uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized
and protected by the constitutions of those States.
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which
the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can
supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Commu-
nity law.
The submissions of the applicant must be examined in the light of these prin-
ciples.
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The ECJ first formally referred to the ECHR in the 1974
case Rutili v. Minister for the Interior,96 concerning the free move-
ment of workers. The ECJ held that the limitations that were
placed on the Member States' power to control non-nationals
are a reflection of the general principles enshrined in the
ECHR.297 In the subsequent case Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rhein-
land-Pfaz,2 98 which once again involved the relationship between
EC law and the principles of the German constitution, the ECJ
confirmed that EC human rights law is based on a broad outline
of general principles of fundamental rights that are considered
to be an integral part of the general principles of law.2 99 These
developments in EC human rights protections have been consid-
ered sufficient by the German Constitutional Court which over-
ruled Solange I in Wunsch Handelsgesellschaft, °° commonly re-
ferred to as Solange II, and held that it will no longer exercise its
jurisdiction to rule on the sufficiency and applicability of EC
law.3 01
Despite the numerous EC references to the ECHR and com-
mon constitutional traditions, °2 these rights are neither devel-
oped nor used to strike down EC provisions.30 3 The Kent Kirk
case °4 is a rare example of an individual benefiting from ECJ
reliance on the principles of the ECHR. °5 In this case, the ECJ
upheld the ECHR provision that penal provisions may not have
retroactive effect.306 This holding is arguably one of the clearest
Id.
296. See Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219 (regard-
ing validity of Member State residence permit that prevented plaintiff from entering
four French departments and, therefore, affected his political and trade union activi-
ties, even though he was Italian national residing in France).
297. Id. at 1232. The Court states, "[t]aken as a whole, these limitations placed on
the powers of Member states in respect of control of aliens are a specific manifestation
of the more general principle, enshrined in Articles 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . . . ." Id.
298. Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727,
[1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42.
299. WESSMAN, supra note 187, at 34-35.
300. Bundesverfassungsgericht, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225.
301. WESSMAN, supra note 187, at 36.
302. See supra notes 260, 261 (citing references to human rights protection in trea-
ties establishing European Community).
303. COMMUNrrY METHODS, supra note 17, at 16.
304. Kent Kirk, Case 63/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2689-718.
305. COMMUNrrY METHODS, supra note 17, at 16.
306. Kent Kirk, [1984] E.C.R. at 2689-718. "The principle that penal provisions
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showings of ECJ support of the ECHR.307
4. International Treaties and Conventions
Although EC law supports the protection of human rights308
and often references the ECHR, this patchwork organization
causes problems with the consistent application of EC human
rights laws.3 °9 The ECHR cannot correct this confusion, as the
European Community is not a member.310 As a non-member,
the European Community is not bound by the ECHR to any for-
mal human rights legislation, therefore, in a case of EC violation
of an ECHR provision, an applicant would have no recourse
under the ECHR against the European Community or other
Member States that are not contracting parties.3 1 1
Because there exists no formal human rights legislation that
is binding on the European Community as a whole, alleged vic-
tims or Member States are presented with the option of report-
ing to a number of organizations. 31 ' These include the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,3 1 3 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 14 the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,1 5 the Convention on the Elimination of All
may not have retroactive effect is one which is common to all legal orders of the Mem-
ber States and is enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as a fundamental right; it takes its place
among the general principles of law whose observance is ensured by the Court ofJus-
tice." Id. at 2689.
307. COMMUNTY METHODS, supra note 17, at 16-17.
308. See Opinion 2/94, [1996] C.M.L.R. at 290, 32,34 ("Respect for human
rights is ... a condition of the lawfulness of Community acts.")
309. Noel, supra note 39, at 525-26.
310. COMMUNrry METHOD, supra note 17, at 17.
311. See Refugee, supra note 219 (discussing need for EC governing bodies to con-
tinue to examine ways to reduce duplication of reporting and reporting burden on
Member States).
312. Id.
313. LAURiDS MIKAELSEN, EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF HUMAN RiGHTs 9 (1980). The
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the International Covenant on
Ecomonic, Social and Cultural Rights on December 16, 1966, for the purpose of estab-
lishing a Human Rights Committee and requiring acceptance of its rules as a condition
on the U.N. Control System. Id. The International Covenant on Ecomonic, Social and
Cultural Rights entered into force on January 3, 1976, after being ratified by the requi-
site thirty-five states. Id.
314. Id. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations, entered into force on March 23, 1976. Id.
315. Id.
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Forms of Discrimination against Women,1 6 the Convention on
the Rights of the Child,1 7 and the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment.318
s
D. Human Rights Violations
Violations of human rights are not only occurring within
the European Community, 19 such as in Northern Ireland. 2 '
They are also occurring in those states vying for EC membership,
such as Turkey,3 2' and in states that have entered into free trade
agreements with the European Community, such as Estonia322
and Latvia. 23 Additionally, human rights violations in states bor-
dering EC Member States influence human rights issues in the
European Community.324
1. Human Rights Violations in the European Community -
Northern Ireland
For decades,325 Northern Ireland has been a state plagued
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Britain CallsforReforms to Court of Human Rights, LONDON TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1996,
available in WEstAw, 1996 WL 6535006. In fact, over the past thirty years, the highest
number of human rights claims were brought against Italy, followed by Turkey and
Great Britain. Id. Of the eighty cases brought against Great Britain, violations of
human rights were found in thirty-seven cases. Id.; see Nadire Mater, Turkey: Response to
Child Torture Claim Fails to Deter Critics, Nov. 22, 1996, available on WasTLAw, 1996 WL
13589334 [hereinafter Child Torture] (citing cases of abuse and murder of children in
Belgium); LAWYERS CoMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AT THE CROSSROADS: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 1 (1996) [hereinafter CROSSROADS]
(stating allegation that United Kingdom was in violation of ECHR and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") during period from late 1994 until
February 1996).
320. CROSSROADS, supra note 319, at 1-3 (discussing years of human rights viola-
tions in Northern Ireland, and examining the continuation of emergency powers of
U.K authorities).
321. Lewis, supra note 12, at 8 (noting human rights violations in Turkey).
322. U.N.: Draft on achieving goal of gender equality in secretariat staffing one of three
texts approved-Pt.2, Nov. 26 1996, M2 Presswire, available in WEsrAw,' 1996 WL 13552942
[hereinafter U.N. Draft] (discussing violations in Estonia and Latvia).
323. Id.
324. Womack, supra note 37, at 11.
325. CROSSROADS, supra note 319, at 3-4 (stating that use of emergency powers to
counter this political instability has been disputed since 1973, and noting that Northern
Ireland has been in state of civil discord for past twenty-five years).
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by human rights problems,326 suffering violent and ongoing civil
strife. 2 7 Not only is this occurring at the hands of groups such
as the Irish Republican Army2 8 that is allegedly responsible for
personal, terrorist attacks against Northern Ireland's judges and
their families, 29 but also violations exist in domestic legislation
that derogates fundamental standards of fairness.330 Addition-
ally, the.Lawyers Committee for Human Rights33 1 has stated its
concern that Northern Ireland's judicial system insufficiently
protects due process and other rights of its citizens332 because
due process protections are among the freedoms most vulnera-
ble to government intrusion. 3 3 There also exist more publicized
forms of violence against human rights in Ireland, even in light
of attempted peace discussions," such as bombings in London,
Manchester, and Northern Ireland, and the killing of Warrant
Officer James Bradwell. 35
The emergency regime in Northern Ireland also provides a
situation in which the violation of such rights is an effective vehi-
cle for state response to crisis.33 6 For example, there have been
concerns in Northern Ireland regarding an alleged shoot-to-kill
policy of law enforcement, and collusion between paramilitary
organizations and state security forces.33 7 Alleged human rights
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 57.
329. Id. at 57-58.
330. Id. at 66.
331. Id. at 145. "Since 1978, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has
worked to protect and promote fundamental human rights. Its work is impartial, hold-
ing each government to the standards affirmed in the International Bill of Human
Rights...." Id.
332. Id. at 61.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 3-4.
On August 31, 1994 the [IRA] declared a complete cessation of military
operations. On October 13, 1994 the combined Loyalist Military command
responded by declaring its own ceasefire. The Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA) declared a "tactical rather than permanent" ceasefire in a statement
issued on May 1, 1995 .... The ceasefire commitment was shattered on Febru-
ary 9, 1996 when a terror bombing occurred in the eastern dock area of
London, for which the IRA claimed responsibility.
Id.
335. Id. at 4.
336. Id. at 3-4.
337. Id. at 7, 9 and n.6 (citing MARK URBAN, BIG Boys RuLEs: THE SECRET STRUG-
GLE AGAINST THE IRA, at xvii (1992); KADAR AsMAL, SHOOT TO KILL?, INTERNATIONAL
1997] EUROPEAN UNION TREATY REFORM
violations also occur regularly in Castlereagh, the main deten-
tion center for emergency arrests in Northern Ireland.33 8 Ac-
cording to the U.N. Humans Rights Committee, the facility rou-
tinely deprives inmates of humane, clean cells, and access to nat-
ural daylight and exercise, and it thus urges Casrlereagh's
closure. 39
2. Human Rights Violations in States Awaiting EC
Membership - Turkey
Turkey's application for membership in the European
Union 40 exemplifies the potential human rights issues341 the
European Community must address as it continues to grow and
looks to admit new members. 42 Turkey has been internally war-
ring since 1984.s~s More than 21,000 people have been killed in
the Government's campaign against the Marxist Kurdish Work-
ers Party ("PKK") .1 4  Both the Kurds and the Turkish Govern-
ment have committed human rights abuses against the civilian
population.3 45 Eyewitnesses to these abuses allege that many of
the killings, instances of torture, and kidnappings occurred at
the hands of Turkish security forces3M6 Much of this torture has
been inflicted on children. 47 There are cases where police and
LAWYER'S INQUIRY INTO THE LETHAL USE OF FIREARMS BY THE SECURITY FORCES IN NORTH-
ERN IRELAND 10 (1985)).
338. Id. at 9.
339. Id. (citing Comments of the U.N. Human Rights Committee CCPR/c/79/
Add. 55, July 27, 1995, para. 22).
340. See WESTLAKE, supra note 2, at 390-91 (listing Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia,
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Lithuania among states vying for EC membership).
341. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 8 (noting Turkey's persistent and severe abuse of
human rights).
342. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 22 (stating "the collapse of the Soviet bloc has
also opened up the prospect of further links and enlargement. Poland, the Slovak Re-
public, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania are all seeking closer ties
and eventual membership.").
343. See Kelly Couturier, Security Forces Allegedly Involved in Turkish Criminal Gang,
WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1996, at A24 [hereinafter Turkish Criminal Gang].
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See id. (stating that two reports of lawmakers cited eyewitness testimony that
points to involvement of armed forces in violent gang activity). The Turkish state has
denied allegations of security force excess. Id.
347. See Child Torture, supra note 319. (stating that Istanbul branch of Turkey's
Human Rights Association received 36 complaints about human rights violations
against children in 1995, and 16 in first six months of 1996).
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security forces used beatings and electric shocks, hosed victims
with ice cold water, and sexually abused and tortured child de-
tainees for violations as small as petty-theft. 48 Numerous for-
eign ministers showed support for delaying the EU/Turkey Cus-
toms Union Agreement, based on Turkey's poor human rights
record." 9 In accord with this position, several parliamentarians
were assigned fact-finding missions in Turkey to determine the
extent of human rights violations conducted there. 350
348. Id.
349. Id. "Greece will object to plans to bring Turkey closer to the EU at the Dub-
lin summit, Greek foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos warned yesterday, and called
for 'international military and economic measures' to 'convince' Turkey 'to behave in a
civilized manner.'" Id.; see also Commission Calls Upon Christopher to Reject Turkey's Bid to
Hold OSCE Summit, Nov. 25, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PR Newswire [hereinafter Chris-
topher] (relying on information in letter to U.S. Secretary of State). In a letter from the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE") to Secretary of State of
the United States Warren Christopher, the CSCE requested that the United States deny
consensus on Turkey's proposal to serve as host of a summit meeting of the Heads of
State or Government of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe due
to its dismal human rights record. Id. The European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture has found the incidence of torture and ill-treatment in Turkey to be "wide-
spread" and "systematic." Id. But see Republic of Belarus: News Update, Nov. 22, 1996,
available in WEsrTAw, 1996 WL 13553165 [hereinafter Belarus]. "[T] he tolerance shown
by some powerful countries towards the behavior of Turkey (invasion, expansionist poli-
cies, violation of human rights) has made Turkey even more provocative than before."
Id.; Boris Bachoriz, Agence Fr.-Presse, available in WasmtAw, 1996 WL 12188472 [here-
inafter Bachoriz]. "It [is] important to get EU-Turkey relations out of the difficult
patch, they were currently going through . . . stressing the country's huge strategic
importance. Turkey has its faults but we must not forget it is surrounded by some of
the most unstable and difficult regions in the world." Id.; Compass Middle East Update,
Nov. 22, 1996, available in WEsrtAw, 1996 WL 13944291, Fed. News Serv. MidEast New-
swire [hereinafter Middle East Update]. "A U.S.-based human rights group ... con-
demned the recent wave of suicide bombings by Kurdish separatists in Turkey, saying
that feigning civilian status to attack an enemy was 'a serious violation of customary
law.'" Id.; Fresno Bee, Nov. 21, 1996, at A12, available in WEsntAw, 1996 WL 13893795.
The Amnesty International report that children are victims of torture in Turkey added
to the litany of human-rights complaints lodged by the group against Turkish authori-
ties. Id.; Ankara Dismisses Alleged Catalogue of Rights Abuses, DEUTSCHE PREssE-AGENTUR,
Nov. 20, 1996, available in WErstAw [hereinafter Ankara]. In a similar report, Amnesty
International said that "allegations of sexual torture of juveniles were frequent and in
some cases they are corroborated by medical and other evidence, though detention for
days or weeks without access to doctor, family or lawyer ensures that such evidence is
extremely difficult to obtain." Id.
350. White and Case European Union Report, Vol. 6 No. 3, Sept. 30, 1995 (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal); see also Okak Isik Yurtcu, The Guardian Fea-
tures Page - Letter from Prison, GuARDIAN, Nov. 25, 1996, at T014 [hereinafter Letter from
Prison]. "Turkey has held more journalists in prison than any other country over the
last three years. Yrutcu's case is typical of the charges used by the government to im-
prison dozens ofjournalists" for preparing reports on the Kurdish rebellion, which the
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The story of Abdullah Canan demonstrates what happens if
one challenges authority. 51 Canan brought suit against certain
members of the security force for destroying homes in his village
after the owners refused to become guards.35 2 He was warned by
Major Yurdakul to drop his complaint.35 3 He refused and conse-
quently he disappeared. 54 Later his body was found.55 His son
recounts distress at his father's demise, in particular at the signs
of torture found on Canan's mutilated body. 56 The security
guards had carved off pieces of Canan's face and ears, burned
away his fingertips by electric shocks, and placed Canan's iden-
tity card in a gash they cut in his neck.5 7 Turkish authorities
have acknowledged the existence of torture cases, but insist that
they are neither officially sanctioned nor systematic and that of-
fenders are caught and prosecuted.95 8
3. Human Rights Violations in States that have Entered into
Free Trade Agreements with the European
Community - Estonia and Latvia
The Estonian Government deprived more than 300,000 per-
manent residents 59 of their nationality and their national mi-
nority status.3 60 The Latvian Government similarly deprived
more than 700,000 citizens of the same rights. 361 Both govern-
ments denied approximately one-third of the potential electo-
rate in their countries the right to vote and to be elected, among
other such violations. 62 Concerns have been raised regarding
the possibility that the Estonian and Latvian policies were imple-
Government classifies as propaganda for the PKK or as incitement to racial hatred. Id.
Yurtcu, in a letter sent from the Sakarya prison, stated that "it is impossible to have
other freedoms in a country where there is no freedom of the press." Id.
351. Letter from Prison, supra note 350, at T014.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Child Torture, supra note 319.
359. See WESTLAKE, supra note 2, at 390 (stating that Estonia has applied for mem-
bership in European Community).
360. U.N. Draft, supra note 322.
361. Id.; see WnsTLm, supra note 2, at 390 (stating that Latvia has applied for
membership in European Community).
362. U.N. Draft, supra note 322.
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mented to change the ethnic balance of the countries in order
to create societies based on monoethnic principles.363 Both
these nations are awaiting entry to the European Community.3 64
4. Human Rights Violations in States Bordering the European
Community - Belarus
Although Belarus has not yet applied for EC membership, it
lies in a location strategic to the promotion of European unitys65
at the crossroads in Eastern Europe, bordering Poland, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Russia. 6 ' Belarus President Alexander
Lukashenko has been accused of staging a coup d'etat,3 67 creating
a dictatorship in the former Soviet republic,3 68 and silencing his
363. Id. As a result of the deteriorating social situation in Estonia and Latvia, be-
tween the years of 1991 and 1996 more that 100,000 people had to leave Estonia and
75,000 people had to leave Latvia, all against their wishes. Id. "Most of those who
stayed would not be able to restore their rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights." Id. There are reportedly lists of hundreds of people
who had been separated from their families and who had received orders against the
Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. Id.
364. See WESTLAxE, supra note 2 (noting that Latvia and Estonia have applied for
EC membership).
365. Nato, Russia Should Seek Special Partnership, Germany Says, Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, Nov. 23, 1996, available in WESTLAW. The article states:
The image of the common foe is no longer the motive which unites states
and nations .... Without Poland an integrated Europe would be a Europe
without a heart .... The political developments in Belarus trigger our justi-
fied concern, not only as a neighbour state but also as a member of the Euro-
pean family of democratic states. Belarus is the signatory of international
agreements concerning the respect for democratic norms of behaviour.
Therefore, [Poland's] appeal seems well-grounded that the present crisis in
Belarus be resolved along constitutional lines, with the observance of the right
of all institutions of state power, with the citizen and media freedoms fully
respected.
Id.
366. The Chernobyl of Law, WALL STREET J., Nov. 21, 1996, available in WESTLAW.
The escalating conflict between Belarusian President Alexander Ludashenko and a
united front of Communists and nationalists in the Parliament is particularly signifi-
cant, as Belarus still has 18 SS-25 nuclear ICBMs. Id.
367. Bachoriz, supra note 349; see WoMAcK, supra note 37, at 11 (comparing Be-
larus President Lukashenko with Adolf Hitler, as dictator who similarly rose to power
via ballot box and increased his power at expense of Parliament and extended his own
term by two years).
368. Bachoriz, supra note 349. The U.N. Committee on Disarmament and Inter-
national Security adopted a resolution favoring the ban on use, stockpiling, production,
and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. See Disarmament: U.N. To Pursue Outright Ban
on Landmines, INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 22, 1996, available in WEsTLAw, 1996 WL
13589346. According to a report by Boutros Boutros-Gali, former U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral, these weapons are some of the deadliest of all weapons and they have caused an
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opposition.3 9 Because of its strategic location, uprisings in Be-
larus can greatly affect the stability of the European Union. 7
II. SHOULD THE EUROPEAN UNION AMEND THE TEU AND
ACCEDE TO THE ECHR?
The lack of codified human rights law in the European
Community is not a new concern . 71 The Council's 1996 request
that the ECJ determine whether the Community could accede to
the ECHR172 was preceded by Parliament's37 and the Commis-
sion's3 74 recent push to improve human rights protection in the
European Community. The ECJ has upheld the protection of
human rights by way of general principles of EC law, the com-
mon constitutional traditions of Member States, and interna-
tional instruments, including the ECHR, however, the EC Treaty
contains no catalogue of specific, enumerated rights.5 75 The re-
estimated 25,000 casualties each year and have devastated millions of civilians in the
ethnic conflicts raging mostly in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Id. Ten countries abstained
from the adoption, defending their right to use these deadly landmines as weapons of
self-defense. Id. Two of the ten abstaining countries are Belarus and Turkey, both of
which are awaiting EC membership. Id.
369. The Chernobyl of Law, supra note 366.
370. Authoritarian Belarus Leader Has His Way, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996, available in
WF srLAw, 1996 WL 13950739. "The potential for widening conflict in Belarus has
heightened anxiety in neighboring Poland and Lithuania, both of which crave stability
as they seek EU and NATO membership." Id.; see also WESTLAKE, supra note 2, at 390
(listing states that have applied for membership in European Community or have en-
tered into agreements with European Community).
371. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 12.
372. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 269, at § I, 1 1 (stating "[t]he Council...
requests the Opinion of the Court on the following question: 'Would the accession of
the European Community to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950.. . be compatible with the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community?'").
373. See Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union, O.J. C 77/33 (1984) (rec-
ommending that European Community accede to ECHR and European Social Char-
ter); Dominick, supra note 3, at 668 n.8 (suggesting that Parliament has deemed protec-
tion of human rights in Community to be inadequate)
374. Dominick, supra note 3, at 639:
In October 1989, the... Commission... took its second major step in
ten years toward a Community bill of rights by submitting a draft Community
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights to the Council of Ministers of the Euro-
pean Communities .... The first step was its 1979 proposal to the Council of
Ministers that the European Community... should accede to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ....
Id.
375. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 272, at § III, It 1-2.
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ality of a unified Europe has brought to light the lack of an insti-
tutional EC framework of guaranteed, enforceable fundamental
rights, and EC division over possible solutions.17 1
A. The European Community Should Accede to the ECHR
Member States supporting the ECHR seek a binding cata-
logue of enforceable rights, rather than a mere declaration of
general social principles, as exists in EC law.377 Those nations
supporting accession recognize that all countries are members
of an international community and, therefore, international ob-
ligation is necessary.3 78 According to supporters of accession,
ECHR principles are consistent with EC law. 79 Additionally,
ECHR protections will not challenge the autonomy of the EC
legal order.3 "' Supporters stress the need for a collective body of
law to ensure uniform protection and enforcement of the com-
mon interest in promoting and protecting human rights in an
expanding European Community.38 1
1. International Obligation is More Effective than
Voluntary Support
States arguing for accession to the ECHR 82 emphasize the
difference between respecting human rights by self-limitation,
and protecting human rights by virtue of an international obliga-
tion. 8 3 Under this view, accession would underline the great im-
portance of respect for human rights at the international level
because it would replace the requirement of voluntary coopera-
tion with mandatory adherence.3 84 Accession to the ECHR
376. Dominick, supra note 3, at 668.
377. See id. at 658-59.
378. FAWCETr, supra note 74, at 266.
379. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 277-79, § V, 1 2.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. The Commission, the Parliament, and the Austrian, Belgian, Danish, Ger-
man, Finnish, Greek, Italian, and Swedish Governments support accession of the Com-
munity to the legal system of the ECHR. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 280, § V, 1 4; see UN. Draft, supra note 322 (noting that "[i]t [is] vital to
strengthen State responsibility in the fulfillment of their international commitments in
order to achieve progress in this field [of international humanitarian law]."); William
N. Gianaris, The New World Order and the Need for an International Criminal Court, 16 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 88, 119 (1992) (stating that institutional framework of human rights
protection must be established at EC level); Amnesty International Urges Greater Protection
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would allow EU institutions, EC Member States, and the ECHR
to work together in cases where national rules or EC principles
are disputed. 585 Such nations argue that the constitutionaliza-
tion of fundamental human rights laws by virtue of international
obligation is an essential component of a choate federal sys-
tem. 86 Such a federal system may be threatened by restrictive
holdings of the ECJ regarding the compatibility of Community
law with human rights law.38 7 The ECHR would provide a system
of checks and balances that the European Community now
lacks.""8
Additionally, supporters of accession argue that interna-
tional obligation at the EC level is more effective that voluntary
ECJ support of the ECHR because EC violations of human rights
may be more difficult to recognize than outward Member State
violations, such as imprisonment, slavery, or systematic racial
and gender discrimination."8 9 Although EC action is not con-
ducted in view of the public and, thus, is not subjected to as
much public scrutiny as that of the Member States, 9 0 the ECJ's
decisions can affect EC citizens perhaps even more greatly in
that they become a part of the EC and Member States' legal heri-
tage.5 91
of Human Rights, Updated European Report, § 2157 (provided by the European Com-
mission Information Service) (on file with Fordham International Law Journal) (stating
necessity of system of accountability for EC violation of ECHR).
385. Gianaris, supra note 384, at 119.
386. Dominick, supra note 3, at 640.
387. WEssmAN, supra note 187, at 57-59. See A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS,
HuMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS
(3d ed. 1993) ("In its early case law the Court of Justice refused to consider any rights
other than those set out in the Treaty of Rome."); Stork, [1959] E.C.R. 17 (strictly inter-
preting Treaty and finding for defendant).
388. See COMMUNITY METHODS, supra note 17, at 18 (stating that European Com-
munity is not subject to system of checks and balances).
389. Id.
The Community does not hang, torture or imprison people, nor does it have a
record of genocide, slavery or systematic racial discrimination. However, its
action may still have far-reaching effects on the social and economic lives of its
citizens, and due to the very nature of its procedures, provisions and decisions
are not made in the glare of public attention.
Id.
390. Id.
391. Van Gend en Loos, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, 12. "Independently of the
legislation of Member States, Community law... not only imposes obligations on indi-
viduals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal
heritage." Id.
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2. The ECHR is Consistent with EC Law and is Supported by
the EC Institutions
The EC order has developed from an economically driven
idea to one that emphasizes the citizen of the European
Union. 92 Member states suggesting accession to the ECHR state
that it is consistent with, and necessary for the continuation of,
such development."9 3 Indeed, of eight requirements on which
the European Union is deemed to depend, European citizen-
ship and a common framework of fundamental human rights
and freedoms is one. 94 The ECJ considers the ECHR interpre-
tation of human rights measures, demonstrating the importance
of human rights in EC law. 95 There has been increasing sup-
port among EC institutions for EC accession to the ECHR.3 96
The principles of EC law already accept the principles of rights
and freedoms enumerated in the ECHR.3 97 Parliament empha-
sized the need for the ECJ, the European Community, and Mem-
ber States to be subject to the same international control in the
human rights arena.398 The ECJ has also recognized that the EC
392. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 8, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 595 (setting forth
rights and requirements of EU citizenship).
393. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 281-84, § VI, 1 1.
394. VENABLES, supra note 166, at 2. The eight demands that, if completed would
achieve European Union are a central bank and economic and monetary union, major-
ity voting in the Council of Ministers on environmental and social policies, a common
foreign currency, elements of a European citizenship and a common framework for
fundamental human rights and freedoms, the establishment of a Regional Assembly to
deal with policies affecting the European Community, democratically elected represent-
atives of the European Community, a Commission president that is more responsive to
the people and that would hold office for the same term as Parliament, and the require-
ment that EC law is a product of ajoint agreement of the Council, Member States, and
the Parliament. Id. at 2-3.
395. Id. at 2-3.
396. See European Parliament Proposal of 18 January 1994, O.J. C 44/32 (1994)
(supporting accession to ECHR, adopted on basis of report of Committee on Legal
Affairs and Citizens' Rights); see also Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 274, § III, 10
(stating "[t]he European Parliament has on several occasions made statements in fa-
vour of accession .... ").
397. Opinion 2/94 at § VI, 1.
When it refers to the [ECHR], the [ECJ] takes into consideration the interpre-
tation given by the organs of the [ECHR], thus underlining the specific place
of rights guaranteed by the [EHCR] in the Community legal order. To that
extent, the autonomy of the Community legal order ... is from now on simply
relative."
Id.
398. See id. (noting "(a]ccording to the Parliament, the choice of Article 235 of the
Treaty should be supplemented by reference to the second subparagraph of Article
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Treaty was not complete, acknowledging that certain general
principles of law, including respect of fundamental human
rights, are part of the new EC legal order,"' even though the EC
Treaty does not sufficiently address them.40 Additionally, the
Commission urged the Council of Ministers, in a February 1979
Commission Report on Accession to the European Conven-
tion,"° that the European Community formally accede to the
ECHR and render the ECHR's catalogue of basic rights legally
binding on EC institutions and Member States." 2 In October
1989, the Commission submitted a draft Community Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights403 to the Council of Ministers, dem-
228(3) of the Treaty, requiring, for the conclusion of certain international agreements,
the assent of the Parliament.")
399. See Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 623. "The European Community constitutes a
new legal order of international law, for the benefit of which the Member States have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which
compromise not only Member States but also their nationals." Id. (citing Van Gend en
Loos, [1963) E.C.R. 1); see Stewart, supra note 72, at 41 (discussing relationship between
Member States and Community in this new world order);J.H.H. Weiler, The Transforma-
tion of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) (discussing unique quality of Community's new
legal order).
400. Nold, [1974] E.C.R. 491 (holding that fundamental rights and international
law form integral parts of Community law that ECJ would safeguard); Hauer v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727 (protecting fundamental rights); Inter-
nationae Handesgesselschaft, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (discussing term "democratic defi-
cit" and reaffirming Nold).
401. Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human
Rights-Commission Memorandum, 25 EC BuLL., no. 2, at 79 (1992) [hereinafter EC
BuLL. 2/79]. Accession was first formally proposed by the Commission to the Council
in the Memorandum on the accession of the European Communities to the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on April 4, 1979.
Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 273, § III, 7.
402. Id.
403. See Dominick, supra note 3, at 639-40 and nn.2, 13 (discussing Community
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights ("Charter") and its enumerated social and eco-
nomic rights of workers and citizens). The Charter was adopted by an eleven to one
majority over the objection of the United Kingdom. Id. "The European Parliament
regretted 'that the Charter has not been embodied in Community law by means of
binding instruments.'" Id. at 642 n.13 (citing Doc. A 3-69/89, 2, O.J. C 323/44, at 45
(1989)); see also The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights (adopted by a
11 to 1 majority of European Council at December 8-9, 1989 meeting in Strasbourg);
Agence Europe, Dec. 11-12, 1989, No. 5151, at 3; European File, Community Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, May 1990, at 2. The United Kingdom was the
dissenting vote. Dominick, supra note 3, at 639-40. The proposal contained 30 articles
enumerating 10 basic rights guaranteed to workers and citizens of the Community. Id.
They include a right to: freedom of movement, employment and remuneration, im-
provement of living and working conditions, social protection, freedom of association
and collective bargaining, vocational training, equal treatment for men and women,
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onstrating the importance of the constitutionalization 40 4 of fun-
damental civil rights in a unified international system like that of
the European Community. In 1990, the Commission's 1979 pro-
posal to accede to the Convention was renewed,405 and in 1993,
the Commission published a working document entitled "Acces-
sion of the Community to the European Convention on Human
Rights and the Community Legal Order" which focused on ac-
cession and the resulting legal and jurisdictional questions in-
volved.4 ° 8
3. Accession Presents No Jurisdictional Problems
According to the Member State supporting accession to the
ECHR, the ECHR does not threaten the autonomy of the EC
legal order because its control machinery has no direct effect in
the EC legal order.40 7 Article 62 of the ECHR408 states its respect
for Article 219 of the EC Treaty4°9 and would exclude any action
between the European Community and Member States. 410 The
Swedish Government states that accession would only be incom-
patible, and might undermine the legal order of the European
Community, if the CHR failed to observe the binding character
of the ECJ. 411 The ECHR merely imposes minimum standards
on contracting parties and does not affect the development of
workers' right to information, consultation, and participation, health and safety protec-
tion at the workplace, and protection of children and adolescents, elderly persons, and
disabled persons. Id.
404. Id. at 639-40.
405. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 274, § III, 8.
406. Id. at 274, § III, 9.
407. Id. at 281-84, § VI, 1 1. In addition, the Belgian Government suggests that
complete autonomy of the European Community on the issue of human rights is not
desirable. Id. (submission of Belgian Government).
408. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 62, 213 U.N.T.S. at 250. Article 62 states:
The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they
will not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force be-
tween them for the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a dispute arising
out of the interpretation or application of this Convention to a means of set-
tlement or other than those provided for in the Convention.
Id.
409. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 219, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 710. Article 219 states,
"Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for
therein." Id.
410. Id.
411. Opinion 2194, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 281-84, § VI, I 1 (submission of Swedish
Government).
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human rights protection from other sources41 2 recognized by
the EC legal order and the common constitutional traditions of
the European Community and individual Member States.413 A
state may, through its own legislative channels, for example, in-
stitute human rights laws that are more strict or more specific
than those of the ECHR.41 4 The involvement of the CHR in EC
law would be essentially the same as in the case of individual
Member States. 4 15 The CHR would not have jurisdiction to rule
on questions of EC law,416 just as the CHR cannot invalidate or
annul a national measure that is in dispute. 417 The lack of a per-
sonal link between the ECJ and the CHR,418 such as one judge
sitting on both the ECJ and the CHR at the same time,41 9 could
ensure EC autonomy. 42 °
Additionally, respect for the autonomy of the EC legal order
does not preclude external involvement, but requires the
supremacy of EC law.42 1 The German Government, in its sub-
mission to the ECJ, stressed that the sole obligation that the
ECHR would impose on the European Community, namely a
minimum level of respect for human rights, is within the limits
412. See CASTERG, supra note 11, at 7 (stating that provisions establish minimum
standard for Member States, and suggesting that nothing in ECHR precludes Member
State from enacting more stringent human rights laws); ECHR, supra note 11, art. 26,
213 U.N.T.S. at 238 (stating domestic remedies rule).
413. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 281-84, § VI, I 1 (submission of Austrian
Government).
414. CASTBERG, supra note 11, at 7.
415. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 281-84, at § VI, 1 (submission of Aus-
trian Government). The Swedish Government considers that accession could only be
incompatible if the Court of Human Rights failed to observe the binding character of
the ECJ, thus undermining the legal order of the Community. Id.
416. Id.
417. Opinion 2/94, at § VI, 1 (submission of Belgian Government). The Italian
Government, in its oral observations, also pointed out that the "judgments of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights do not have direct effect in the internal legal systems and
cannot have the effect of declaring internal acts unlawful." Id.
418. Id. The German Government, in its submission to the Court of Justice,
stressed, "[t]he sole obligation which the Convention would impose on the Commu-
nity, namely a minimum level of respect, is within the limits laid down in Opinion 1/91
.... The German Government also refers to the fact that there is no personal link
between the two courts." Id.
419. Id. The German Government "refers to the fact that there is no personal link
between the two courts." Id.
420. See id. (referencing submission of Greek Government).
421. See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 171, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687 (requiring that
Member States observe rules of ECJ); supra note 139 (quoting text of Article 171).
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previously laid down.4 2 In addition, the movement toward Eu-
ropean unity necessarily entails the transfer of some state powers
to the European Community.423 Such a transfer requires that
the Community be subject to the same control as the Member
States that are contracting parties in order to restore the balance
originally desired by EC Member States.424
4. Need for Uniformity
As human rights laws and the law governing EC officials are
areas of particular importance, the Austrian Government refers
to the need for a uniform interpretation 42 5 of the ECHR by the
European Community due to the continuing increase in the in-
tegration envisaged by the TEU.42 1 Some scholars have sug-
gested that European integration be placed on two tracks, one
for those nations that are ready for complete European integra-
tion, and one for those that are not.42 7 Regarding the concern
422. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 281-84, 278-79, § VI, 1.
423. Id. at 278-79, § V, 2 (observations of ttalian Government).
424. Id.
425. See Weiler & Haltern, supra note 137, at 432 (describing danger of non-uni-
form laws). The danger of leaving a door open for Member States to have the final say
on the competencies of the European Community becomes clear through a hypotheti-
cal situation, demonstrating how the results could directly contradict the purposes of
the Treaties, including, according to Article 2, harmonious and balanced development,
social cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. Id. Consider the following ex-
ample:
State A, in the face of an unfavorable judicial decision, unilaterally abrogates
Treaty provision X on the grounds that it is, in its eyes, ultra vires. The inter-
national law principle of reciprocity would mean that the particular obligation
would cease to be operative between State A and States B-Z. This would result
in a situation where the provision is applied among B-Z, but not in the rela-
tionships of B-Z and A. Imagine that State B abrogates on the same grounds
for provision Y, and State C for provision Z, and so on. The result is a prag-
matic nightmare and open-textured Treaties.
Id.
426. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 278-79, § V, 1 2; see WsTLAXE, supra note
2, at 390 (listing Member States and those that have applied for membership in Euro-
pean Community or have entered into agreements with European Union).
427. See O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 37. This split is referred to as "variable geome-
try," which refers to the growing concern as to whether it is feasible to expect all, espe-
cially new Member States, to move toward European integration at the same speed. Id.
For example, Germany, which leads the maximalist camp, wants to make the European
Union more transparent and capable of absorbing new members. Id. German Foreign
Minister Klaus Kindel emphasized that European Integration should move forward, fo-
cusing partially on improving basic civil rights at the European Union level and further
developing the concept of EU Citizenship in the Treaty of Rome. Id. The United King-
dom, in contrast, focuses on containment rather than reform. Id. The United King-
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as to whether complete uniformity desired of European integra-
tion is feasible at all, supporters stress the need to focus on im-
proving basic civil rights at the European Union level and fur-
ther developing the concept of EU citizenship.4 28
Basic civil rights, such as the right to due process, 42 9 have
developed on a case-by-case basis, which has resulted in gaps in
EC human rights protection.3 0 Such gaps may lead to a situa-
tion in which the European Community and the ECHR have di-
vergent interpretations of the ECHR, and may present a case in
which an individual's human rights are violated by EC law, yet
the individual has no remedy against the European Commu-
nity.431 For example, similar violations of general principles of
Community law might lead to different results in different Mem-
ber States and EC institutions.43 2 EC institutions have spoken
against this result and have demonstrated increasing support for
strengthening human rights laws.4 3 This was largely in reaction
to the 1974 Solange /' decision of the German Constitutional
Court which held that absent a catalogue of fundamental rights
dom opposed further increase in ECjurisdiction or any proposals that promote a feder-
alized Europe and supports only the improvement of existing institutions. Id. Further-
more, the United Kingdom proposed that Member States not be required to pay
damages to the European Union if, after a good faith effort, they fail to implement
binding measures. White and Case European Union Report, Vol. 7 No. 2,June 1996, at
3-4.
428. Id.
429. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 (providing that no State shall "deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."); see ANTHONY C. CiciA,
Note, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice Harlan's Substantive Due
Process Formulation, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241 (1996) (analyzing and criticizing modem
due process jurisprudence).
430. Dominick, supra note 3, at 656-57.
431. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 278-79, § V, 1 2 (submission of Belgian
Government).
432. See Stewart, supra note 72, at 43. "For example, in one Member State, but not
in another, the consequences of infringement of employment rights might give rise to
criminal liability; or the courts of one Member State may specifically enforce a right
based on Community law whereas in another the remedy may lie in damages alone."
Id.
433. See Dominick, supra note 3, at 652 (stating "[e]fforts by both the Commission
and the Parliament to move forward [in strengthening human rights in the Commu-
nity] have been thwarted by various Member States in the Council of Ministers, includ-
ing France, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.").
434. Solange 1, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540. This decision came after, and largely in
response to, the 1970 Internationale Handelsgessellschaft decision of the ECJ. See Internatio-
nale Handelsgessellschaft mbH v. Einfur- und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (holding that Community law is supreme).
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or a legislative power sufficient to balance EC institutions, Ger-
man law was supreme over EC law in the human rights arena.435
Supporters of accession impliedly rely on the U.S. concept of
due process,43 6 suggesting that EC civil and human rights consti-
tutional laws should not remain fixed to only those provided for
in the EC Treaty.43 7
B. The European Union Should Not Accede to the ECHR
Nations that do not support EC accession to the ECHR rely
on EC Treaty restrictions and the principle of subsidiarity which
state that EC action is confined to the specific powers enumer-
ated in the EC Treaty, of which accession to an international
human rights organization is not one.438 Another concern re-
garding EC accession to the ECHR involves institutional con-
435. Dominick, supra note 3, at 643. In Solange I, the German Constitutional
Court held that so long as there neither existed a written catalogue of fundamental
rights nor a viable legislative power sufficient to balance the other Community organs,
German law would be considered superior to Community law in the area of human
rights. Id. The ECJ expressly rejected this view in Internationale Handelsgessellschaft,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540.
436. See Cicia, supra note 429 (discussing due process).
437. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that in prosecution in state
court for state crime, Fourteenth Amendment does not permit admission of evidence
obtained by unreasonable search and seizure). In the plurality opinion, Justice Frank-
furter stated:
Due Process conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It is
the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce
because they are basic to our free society. But basic rights do not become
petrified as of any one time, even tough, as a matter with human experience,
some may not too rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature
of a free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and
right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined
within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the
limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.
To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is fundamentally
right for purposes of legal enforcement may satisfy a longing for certainty but
ignores the movements of a free society. It belittles the scale of the concep-
tion of due process. The real clue to the problem confronting the judiciary in
the application of the Due Process Clause is not to ask where the line is once
and for all drawn but to recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the
gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion.' . . . This was the
Court's insight when first called upon to consider the problem; to this insight
the Court has on the whole been faithful as case after case has come before it
since Davidson v. New Orleans was decided.
Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
438. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 3(b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590; see supra note 77
(quoting text of Article 3(b) and defining Community competences).
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cerns about EC involvement in the ECHR, the potential erosion
of ECJ authority, and the threat to the autonomy of the EC legal
order presented by accession. 43 9 According to states that reject
the notion that the human rights protection in EC law is insuffi-
cient because the European Community is already bound by the
ECHR, alternatives other than accession are more appropri-
ate.4 0
1. The European Union Is Already Bound to ECHR Principles
by Article F2 and Case Law
According to the Member State governments opposing EC
accession to the ECHR, present EC law comprises a complete
and sufficient system of remedies for the violation of an individ-
ual's human rights.441 These nations argue that the ECJ has sub-
stantially incorporated the ECHR into the EC legal order and
fully integrated it into the corpus of EC law.442 Non-supporters
of accession generally agree that the objectives of the TEU, in-
cluding its preamble considerations of liberty, democracy, and
respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of
law,' are sufficiently guaranteed by present human rights law
in the European Community.' 4 They view accession as a possi-
439. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 281-86, § VI, 11 1-2.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 284-86, § VI, 1 2 (submission of Spanish Government).
442. Id. at 279-80, § V, 1 3 (submission of Portuguese, Spanish, and French Gov-
ernments).
443. TEU, supra note 8, pmbl., OJ. C 224/1, at 2 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 725-
26. In pertinent part, the Preamble confirms the EU Member States "attachment to the
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms and of the rule of law," and their desire "to deepen the solidarity between their
peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions," and their de-
sire "to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institution so
as to enable them better to carry out, within a single institutional framework, the tasks
entrusted to them .... " Id.
444. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 632.
After Solange II, the standard of protection of fundamental rights by EC Courts
has not been lowered. To the contrary, both the system of fundamental rights
and their extent have been completed. The ECJ requires an effective judicial
protection of fundamental rights. Co-operation between the ECJ with the na-
tional courts is mandated in the framework of preliminary rulings under Arti-
cle 177 of the EC Treaty.
The system of protection of fundamental rights in the European Commu-
nity closely resembles the German one, except for a catalogue in the constitu-
tion.
Id.; see supra note 128 (quoting text of EC Treaty Article 177).
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ble affront to national sovereignty, to the autonomy of the EC
legal order, and to the ECJ's monopoly of jurisdiction. 445 The
French Government, for example, in its submissions to the ECJ,
lists the fundamental rights enshrined by the ECHR, the protec-
tion of which the ECJ upheld." 6
2. Accession to the ECHR Will Erode ECJ Authority and
Undermine the Authority of the EC Legal Order
Not only do Member States opposing accession to the
ECHR suggest that accession is not necessary in the context of
the operation of the common market, but also they maintain
that it will allow the ECHR control organs to interpret EC law
and possibly trump the ECJ's power.4 7 The Portuguese Govern-
ment suggests that formal EU accession to the ECHR would
amount to the ECHR interpreting EC law and making decisions
regarding the competence of the European Community.448 The
Spanish Government specified articles of the ECHR that ques-
tion the autonomy of the EC legal order.449 Among these are
Articles 24 and 25 of the ECHR,411 establishing inter-State and
individual petitions, Articles 32 and 46 of the ECHR,4 51 confer-
ring a binding character on the decisions of the ECHR, and Arti-
cle 62 of the ECHR,452 submitting all disputes between con-
tracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of
445. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R1 at 279-80, § V, 3.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 284-86, § VI, 2.
448. Id. at 279-80, § V, 3 (submission of Portuguese Government).
449. Id. at 284-86, § VI, 2 (submission of Spanish Government).
450. ECHR, supra note 11, arts. 24, 25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38; see supra notes 224,
225 (quoting text of ECHR Articles 24 and 25).
451. ECHR, supra note 11, arts. 32, 46, 213 U.N.T.S. at 221, 241-42, 246; see supra
note 218 (quoting text of ECHR Article 32). Article 46 states:
1. Any of the high Contracting Parties may at any time declare that it recog-
nizes as compulsory ipsofacto and without special agreement the jurisdiction of
the Court in all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the
present Convention.
2. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on
condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain of the High Con-
tracting parties or for a specified period.
3. These declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe who shall transmit copies thereof to the High Contracting
Parties.
ECHR, supra note 11, art. 46, 213 U.N.T.S. at 221.
452. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 62, 213 U.N.T.S. at 221, 250; supra note 408 (quot-
ing text of ECHR Article 62).
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the ECHR to the means of settlement laid down therein.453 Addi-
tionally, to Member States opposing accession, accession would
undermine the supremacy of the ECJ and its monopoly of juris-
diction .4 54 The Spanish Government also noted ECHR articles
that arguably call into question the supremacy of the ECJ, in-
cluding Article 45 of the ECHR,455 conferring jurisdiction on the
CHR over the interpretation and application of the ECHR, Arti-
cle 52 of the ECHR,456 regarding the finality of the decisions of
the CHR, Article 53 of the ECHR,4 57 obliging the contracting
parties to abide by judgments of the CHR, and Article 54 of the
ECHR,458 vesting the Committee of Ministers with a duty to su-
pervise the execution of judgments. The Spanish Government
suggests that all of the above-mentioned articles are incompati-
ble with Article 219 of the EC Treaty459 and the ECJ would ex-
amine the legality of EC law in the light of the ECHR, thus im-
pacting on its case-law.46 °
The Portuguese Government refers to the difficulty in devis-
ing ECHR control machinery to accommodate EC participation
in the ECHR.1 1 Accession to the ECHR itself would raise insti-
tutional questions regarding the ECHR bodies.462  The ECHR
and its protocols would have to be amended because it is only
open to membership by individual states and the Council of Eu-
453. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 284-86, § VI, 1 2 (submission of Spanish Gov-
emnment).
454. Id.
455. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246; see supra note 176 (quoting
text of ECHR Article 45).
456. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 52, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248; see supra note 192 (quoting
ECHR Article 52).
457. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 53, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248.
458. Id. art. 54, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248; see supra note 209 (quoting ECHR Article 54).
459. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 219, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 710; see supra note
(explaining content of Article 219).
460. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 284-86, § VI, 2 (submission of Spanish
Government).
461. Id. at 279-80, § V, 3 (submission of Portuguese Government).
462. Id. at 270, § I, 6. Accession to the ECHR itself would raise institutional
questions. Id. Not only would the ECHR and its Protocols have to be amended, as it is
only open to membership by individual states and the Council of Europe, which the
European Community does not propose to join as entity, but the control machinery of
the Convention, which presently provides only for intervention by the Council of Eu-
rope and Member States, must be amended to provide for appropriate Community
power. Id.
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rope." 3 Additionally, the control machinery of the ECHR,
which presently provides only for intervention by the Council of
Europe and contracting parties, would have to be amended to
provide for appropriate EC control in its power structure. 464
Other Member States opposing accession have also noted that
the ECHR, at present, is not equipped to deal with the accession
of the European Union.465 It would be necessary to establish
machinery for determining the entity responsible for violation of
the ECHR's orders and to provide for EC participation in the
ECHR's control bodies, particularly the CHR.16
Member States not supporting accession also question the
ECHR requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies
before an alleged violation is considered and argue that this re-
quirement would force the ECJ to widen its access to the prelimi-
nary-reference procedure.467 This procedure, found in Article
177 of the EC Treaty, specifies circumstances over which the ECJ
has jurisdiction. '  It is argued that, in order to fulfill the ECHR
requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies,469 the ECJ
463. See id. (stating that European Community does not propose to join Council of
Europe).
464. Id. at 279-80, § V, 3 (arguing that control organs of ECHR cannot accom-
modate European Community participation).
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id. EC Treaty Article 177 sets forth the preliminary rulings procedure to
which the French Government refers and states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings con-
cerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member-
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgement, request the Court ofJustice to give
a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court of tribunal
or a member-state, against whose decisions there is not judicial remedy under
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
468. Id.
469. ECHR, supra note 11, art. 26, 213 U.N.T.S. at 238; see supra note 206 (quoting
text of Article 26). Before a petition is admissible to apply forjudgment of the Court of
Human Rights, all internal remedies, including the Community's internal courts and
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might have to expand such jurisdiction, potentially leading to an
overload of cases in the ECJ. 470
3. The Principle of Subsidiarity Suggests that Human Rights
Issues are Better Dealt with at a Local Level
Member States opposing accession to the ECHR rely on the
principle of subsidiarity which states that EC institutions should
not govern actions that are better approached by individual
Member States . 7 1 The principle of subsidiarity has been ele-
vated to the rank of a constitutional principle in the European
Community.4 72 Under the principle of subsidiarity, the Euro-
pean Community shall act within the limits of the powers con-
ferred upon it by the EC Treaty and of the objectives assigned to
it.4 73 All actions taken under the EC Treaty are subject to this
general principle.474 In areas that do not fall within exclusive
EC competence, the European Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Euro-
pean Community. 475 In other words, EC action shall not go be-
yond what is necessary to achieve the specified objectives of the
EC Treaty. 47 6 The Finnish Government,4 77 although conceding
that accession is necessary when considering the need to
strengthen the social aspect of the EC Treaty, stated that the
principle of subsidiarity and the new bases of competence laid
down in the SEA47s have restricted the scope of Article 235.
particularly the Court ofJustice, must first have been exhausted. ECHR, supra note 11,
art. 26, 213 U.N.T.S. at 238.
470. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.L at 279-80, § V, 3.
471. See supra note 77 (defining concept of subsidiarity).
472. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 28.
473. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 18.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 278-79, § V, 2.
478. See SEA, supra note 8, pmbl., O.J. L 169/1, at 4 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at
741 (listing new bases of competence laid down in SEA). In pertinent part, the Pream-
ble states:
[The Community is] [d]etermined to work together to promote democracy
on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and
laws of the Member-States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human
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In accordance with this principle, a Member State is and must
continue to be the highest authority on national soil.
480
4. Proposed Alternatives to Acceding to the ECHR
Those nations that reject accession to the ECHR as an op-
tion to correct the EC human rights deficiency suggest alterna-
tives other than accession to the ECHR.41 The French suggest
that it would be easier to amend the second paragraph of Article
173 of the EC Treaty which grants the ECJ jurisdiction to hear
actions by only Member States, the Council, or the Commis-
sion,48 2 to also enable individuals to challenge EC acts affecting
their fundamental rights, rather than accede to the ECHR.483
Another proposed alternative to EC accession to the control ma-
chinery of the ECHR is the creation of an EC Bill of Rights to
enumerate human rights to be protected in the European Com-
munity.4 84 Additionally, Member States opposing accession sug-
gest that the ECJ refer to the CHR in order to make preliminary
rulings on the interpretation of the ECHR with respect to EC law
and to rectify potential situations in which the ECJ and the CHR
differ on interpretations of treaties regarding human rights,
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, notably
freedom, equality and social justice, Convinced that the European idea, the
results achieved in the fields of economic integration and political co-opera-
tion, and the need for new developments correspond to the wishes of the
democratic peoples of Europe, for whom the European Parliament, elected by
universal suffrage, is an indispensable means of expression,
Aware of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever
increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order
more effectively to protect its common interests and independence, in particu-
lar to display the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and
with human rights to which they are attached, so that together they may make
their own contribution to the preservation of international peace and security
in accordance with the undertaking entered into by them within the frame-
work of the United Nations Charter ....
Id.
479. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (quoting EC Treaty Article 235 in
full).
480. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 6.
481. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 279-80, § V, .
482. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 173, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687-88; see supra note
132 (quoting text of EC Treaty Article 173).
483. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R at 279-80, § V, 3.
484. Dominick, supra note 3, at 639, 642-43, 668 n.10 (relying on statement of
Parliament, regretting that "the Charter has not been embodied in Community law by
means of binding instruments.") (citing Doc. A 3-69/89, 2, OJ. C 323/44, at 45
(1989)).
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rather than allowing the CHR to directly rule on issues concern-
ing EC law.485
III. THE TREATIES MUST BE AMENDED TO ACCOMMODATE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ACCESSION TO THE ECHR
The European Community should amend the EC Treaty to
allow for accession to the ECHR so that the European Commu-
nity, along with its Member States and institutions, will be held
accountable consistently for human rights violations." 6 This so-
lution to the human rights deficiency in the European Commu-
nity would more immediately provide protection to EU citizens
than an EC Bill of Rights,4" 7 and would demonstrate that the
European Community should adapt progressively along with his-
tory in order to protect its people."8 EC accession to the ECHR
is entirely consistent with ideals expressed by EC law and EC in-
stitutions.489 Because a system could be developed to allow for
EC participation in the framework of the ECHR, accession
would present no threat to the EC legal order.490 Furthermore,
EC accession to the ECHR would encourage continued growth
of the European Community.491
A. Amendment of the EC Treaty
The ECJ's holding that present EC powers do not provide
for accession to an international institution such as the ECHR49 1
does not lead to the conclusion that accession is unnecessary,
485. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 279-80, at § V, 3 (submission of Portu-
guese Government).
486. See Internationale Handelsgessellschaft, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 540 (discussing term
democratic deficit).
487. VENABLES, supra note 166, at 29. "It might have been expected that in intro-
ducing the concept of European citizenship, the Treaty would have made a clearer
commitment to the Community adhering to the Council of Europe Convention, per-
haps as a first step toward a Community Bill of Rights as the European Parliament
proposed." Id.
488. See supra note 437 and accompanying text (describing progressive concept of
due process).
489. See supra notes 260-61 (discussing references of EC law to human rights);
supra note 248 (discussing EC reliance on ECHR's principles).
490. See supra notes 414-18 and accompanying text (presenting suggestions for EC
participation in ECHR and solutions for jurisdictional issues).
491. See CASTBERG, supra note 11, at 5 (suggesting that focusing on human rights
protection in European Community will contribute toward greater unity between Mem-
ber States).
492. See Refugee, supra note 219 (discussing requests to U.N. organs and agencies to
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nor does it signify that accession is undesirable. The ECJ's hold-
ing simply means that the European Community must follow an
alternative route, namely amending the EC Treaty, to allow for
accession. The European Community should change with the
times49 and emphasize the protection of EU citizens by institut-
ing an EC Treaty amendment to allow for Community accession
to the ECHR.
The achievements of the European Community should
serve as incentives to improve those areas in which it has short-
comings. Although the EC Treaty does not provide for enumer-
ated Community human rights protection, the European Com-
munity should nonetheless recognize this imperfection49 4 and
amend the EC Treaty to allow for EC accession to the ECHR.
Although the ECJ has established that accession is presently be-
yond the limits established by Articles 228491 and 235496 of the
EC Treaty, and could only be achieved by an EC Treaty amend-
ment, it is clear that the component parts of the European Com-
munity, the Member States, and EC institutions, intend to ad-
here to the principles enumerated in the ECHR. The European
Community must, therefore, amend the EC Treaty to allow for
such accession.
A Treaty amendment providing for EC integration into the
institutional system of the ECHR would formally incorporate
ECHR regulations into Community law. While the concerns of
those nations that do not support accession4 9 7 should be recog-
intensify their contributions to system-wide efforts to promote and protect human
rights in light of fiftieth anniversary of Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
493. Id.
494. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 26.
[T]he Treaties did not map out any coherent scheme for a future common
social policy. This was because there were major differences within the Com-
munity from the outset over whether the establishment of the common mar-
ket required the broad alignment of social security costs or whether in prac-
tice it would inevitable bring the Member States' social security arrangements
into line with one another eventually creating a Community social identity.
Experience soon showed that the economic mechanisms of the common mar-
ket did not automatically lead to social progress and full employment... even-
tually this policy approach had to be overhauled ....
Id.
495. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 228, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 715; see supra note 19
(quoting text of Article 228).
496. EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 235, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 716; see supra note 21
(quoting text of Article 235).
497. See Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 284-86, at § VI, 1 2 (demonstrating that
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nized, the positive results to be achieved and the intention of the
European Community to be bound by the ideals of the ECHR
overrides reservations regarding accession and demonstrates the
importance of an amendment to rectify this democratic defi-
ciency" in the EC Treaty.
B. The European Community Should be Progressive in Promoting and
Protecting Human Rights
The progression toward European unity can follow the lead
of the Supreme Court of the United States 4" which stated that
due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of
what may be, at a given time, the limits of protected, fundamen-
tal rights.50 Similarly, the conception of human rights by the
European Community must also move forward over time, for it is
the very nature of a free society to advance its standards of what
is reasonable and right.5 1 The Commission protects the com-
mon interest of all members of the Council of Europe with re-
spect to and in the enforcement of ECHR provisions.50 2 When
the Commission appears before the ECJ, it is to perform that
task rather than to defend the interests of an individual appli-
cant. 0 ' The ECHR, therefore, is more a vehicle for ensuring the
rights of a society than the rights of particular individuals.50 4
opinions expressed by Member States of European Community demonstrate separation
between those states willing to relinquish more sovereign powers to EU and those less
willing, or not willing at all, to do so).
498. See Internationae Handelsgesselschaft, [1974] 2 C.M.L.RI at 255 (discussing term
democratic deficit).
499. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 6. "Indeed it was an American initiative that led
to the founding of the first postwar European organization in 1948. The US Secretary
of State, George Marshall, called on the countries of Europe to pool their efforts for
economic reconstruction and promised American aid in return (which eventually took
shape as the Marshall Plan)." Id.
500. See supra note 437 and accompanying text.
501. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 6.
502. See FAwCETr, supra note 74, at 271 (noting that some scholars have consid-
ered ECHR to be organ of Council of Europe). The Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe elect the members of the ECHR, and the expenses of the ECHR are
borne by the Council of Europe and its secretariat. Id. ("It does seem in fact advisable
to attach the Commission from an administrative point of view, to the council of Eu-
rope," demonstrating early connection of Convention to institutions of Europe) (citing
Report of Committee of Experts).
503. FAwcEI-r, supra note 74, at 269.
504. Id.
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This is consistent with the newly placed emphasis on EU citizen-
ship and, indeed, would further promote this goal.
Because the extent of EC growth and the challenges it
presents to traditional EC institutions and procedures were not
envisioned by the founders of the European Community, the
original treaties establishing the Communities omitted such pro-
tection of human rights.505 As the movement toward unity fo-
cuses on Europe as a single entity rather than as individual
states, the progression toward EC accession to the ECHR is natu-
ral and necessary. 50 6 EC law confers rights on its Member States
which become parts of their legal heritage. 507 Accordingly, EC
accession to the ECHR would make human rights an inseparable
part of EC legal heritage.
C. Accession to the ECHR is a More Immediate Solution Than
Adopting an EC Bill of Rights
While such bonds could be achieved by drafting an EC Bill
of Rights,508 an argument for accession to the ECHR does not
preclude this possibility. Rather, accession is a necessary step509
to attaining a future EC Bill of Rights.510 European States, while
desiring the benefits of European unity, are reluctant to relin-
quish their national sovereignty.5 ' A rush to draft a binding Bill
of Rights likely would ignite opposition in response to any resig-
nation of national sovereignty 12 because Member States would
have to bargain in order to agree regarding an area traditionally
governed by national regulations. This might spark age-old rival-
505. Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 150 ("A caveat is necessary: I do not profess that
things, competences included, should be frozen in the shape they were given at the
outset.").
506. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 278, § V, 1 2.
507. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
508. Dominick, supra note 3, at 642; see David Edward, Constitutional Rules of Com-
munity Law in EEC Competition Cases, 13 FoRDnAm INT'L L.J. 111 (1990) (comparing
Community's lack of codified rights with U.S. Bill of Rights); Rasmussen, supra note 74,
at 135-36 (comparing EC Treaty to constitutional text).
509. See supra note 487 and accompanying text (suggesting that accession to ECHR
may be first step in direction of EC Bill of Rights).
510. Dominick, supra note 3, at 646.
511. See Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 623 ("The purpose of European integration is to
prevent the evils of nationalism."). The success of total European integration depends
on the willingness of Member States to renounce their traditional concepts of sover-
eignty. Id.
512. EC BuLL. 2/79, supra note 401.
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ries between Member States and impede the successful and
timely attainment of a Bill of Rights. 13
Arguments regarding what rights to protect and what penal-
ties to impose for their violation, would be less likely to arise in
the case of accession, as the ECHR is already established and
such decisions have already been made. 514 Although the ECHR
must undergo institutional changes to accommodate EC partici-
pation,515 the transition into an institutional framework of ex-
plicit, invocable, and directly effective human rights and protec-
tions would be easier than drafting an EC Bill of Rights. 16
Human rights are not tangential issues to be addressed only
when Member States and the European Community agree on
constitutional structures. Such agreement is a goal for which the
European Community should strive, because human rights
forms the foundation of modern, international society.5 17 Acces-
sion to the ECHR is the best solution, whether viewed as the
ends itself, or as the means towards achieving EC agreement on
constitutional issues with hopes of drafting an EC Bill of Rights.
D. The Community has Already Embraced the ECHR's Principles,
Therefore, Accession is Consistent with EC Ideals.
Article F of the TEU518 relies on the guaranteed protection
513. WESSMAN, supra note 187, at 8 ("It is doubtful whether the necessary agree-
ment could be reached in the foreseeable future .... If it were not to do so then ...
acce[ssion] to the European convention would appear to be sufficient.") (citing PJ.G.
KAPTYN & P.V. VAN THERMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TiEs 169 (2d ed. 1989)); see WESTLA E, supra note 2, at 390 (noting fear of war as factor
behind European integration).
514. See Opinion 2/94 [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 269, at § I, 2 (recognizing that text of
ECHR is known and legal issues to which accession gives rise are sufficiently clear). But
see supra notes 461-66 and supporting text (noting that control organs of ECHR would
have to be revised to accommodate Community accession).
515. Id.
516. See id. at 270 § I, 10 (emphasizing that ECHR and CHR have no direct effect
on European Community at present).
517. See BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 80 (stating that "unity is the only sure way to
create and preserve peace, freedom and prosperity in Europe," and in achieving this
unity European Community must focus on human rights and freedoms, which are in-
separable from this worthy goal).
518. TEU, supra note 8, art. F, 1 2, O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
728. "The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States, as general principles of Community law." Id.
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of human rights that the ECHR establishes, which demonstrates.
that the European Community has already embraced the
ECHR's principles. The ECHR's principles, therefore, are con-
sistent with those suggested in EC law, 19 rather than in conflict
with them, and do not challenge the autonomy of the EC legal
order. Furthermore, many Member States and EC institutions
have already accepted the ECHR's principles,520 and EC law re-
lies on them.521 The ECJ itself has suggested that the need for
human rights protection is demonstrated in EGJ and ECHR case
law.5 22 EC accession to the ECHR would satisfy this need for
comprehensive human rights protection and is consistent with
EC goals.
Non-supporters of accession suggest that EC implied reli-
ance on the ECHR is sufficient to protect human rights. Present
case law, however, gives no guidance as to what rights are pro-
tected and what remedies exist for human rights violations. 52
EC references to common constitutional principles and tradi-
tional practices are not helpful because the ECJ selectively distills
common practices from some Member States. Even then, this
only provides vague guidelines for human rights protection. 524
Additionally, this reliance on Member States' common traditions
results in the adoption of the lowest common denominator for
EC human rights protection. This protection of fundamental
rights52 does not change the status quo with regard to vague EC
reliance on the ECHR5 26 and is not an adequate assertion of the
rights that require protection. 7
The provisions of TEU Article F(2) do not add significantly
to the already weak EC protection of human rights.52 This is
partly because the enforcement of such rights could depend on
an individual applicant being an EC national. 529 In contrast, the
519. See id. (demonstrating consistency of ECHR with EC law).
520. See supra notes 392-406 and accompanying text (demonstrating EC support of
ECHR enumerated fundamental rights).
521. See supra note 260-61 and accompanying text (noting references to human
rights in EC law).
522. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 270, § I, 8; Id. at 281-84, § VI, 1.
523. COMMUNrrY METHODS, supra note 17, at 16-17.
524. Id.
525. See supra note 252 (describing origin of general principles of EC law).
526. VENABLES, supra note 166, at 29-30.
527. COMMUNrrY METHODS, supra note 17, at 16.
528. VENABLES, supra note 166, at 30; see id. at 29 (discussing Article F(2)).
529. Id.; see supra notes 392 (referencing European citizenship).
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rights of the ECHR are universal, and are granted to anyone
within the jurisdiction of a contracting party, regardless of his or
her nationality."' °
E. Accession To The ECHR Will Not Jeopardize EC Power
The ECJ has already held that the European Community
may commit to an international institution, as long as such sub-
mission does not challenge the autonomy of the Community
legal order.53' In the case of EC accession to the ECHR, there is
concern as to whether such a holding would apply in a situation
where the compatibility of EC law and the international agree-
ment is at issue.532 This concer is unwarranted, however, be-
cause EC law encompasses the general principles of the ECHR,
rather than conflicting with them. 533 The case law of the ECHR
already influences that of the ECJ534 which argues strongly in
favor of accession being compatible with the EC Treaty.53 5
Member States that both support and reject EC accession to
the ECHR have agreed that their constitutional principles, the
principles of EC law, and the principles of the ECHR are com-
patible and, therefore, amendment allowing for accession does
not question the supremacy of EC law.536 Parliament already has
recognized that the ability to bring a direct action before an in-
ternational court in examining the compatibility of an EC act
with human rights was of utmost importance and it did not ques-
tion the EGJ's competence in EC law issues. 3 7
F. Because it is not a Signatory Party to the ECHR, the European
Community May Violate Human Rights
The potential of EC threats to human dignity could present
a grave situation in the human rights arena.5 38 Because of the
530. VENABLES, supra note 166, at 14.
531. See Opinion 1/91, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-6079.
532. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 274, § II 10.
533. See supra notes 393-406 and accompanying text (discussing similarities be-
tween ECHR and EC law).
534. See supra note 518 and accompanying text (demonstrating ECHR's influence
on EC law).
535. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 283, § VI, 1 (argument of Danish gov-
ernment).
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. COMMUNrry METHODS, supra note 17, at 9-10.
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far reach of EC institutions, their actions have the potential to be
equally as devastating as they are positive."' In the past, the Eu-
ropean Community has been concerned with the protection of
economic rights.5 40 It should now turn to the social needs of its
citizens and ensure their protection at the EC institutional level
in addition to national levels. 4 '
Because full integration encompasses many institutional
changes, both at the EC and Member State level, deadline varia-
tions542 for accession requirements may be necessary for aspiring
Member States, particularly regarding economic growth.543 Cer-
tain matters, however, must not be negotiable544 in the promo-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms because such
protection is at the heart of a united, functional European Com-
munity. 45 Potential EC violations of human rights would under-
mine the stressed importance of human rights protections in the
European Community.
Although the principle of equality is an essential element of
EC law,5" equality will not be achieved if some Member States
belong to the ECHR and are held to a higher standard of human
rights protections, while the European Community is merely
held to a vague standard of human rights protection.5 47 Every-
one affected by the actions of EC institutions must be treated
equally.5" This, however, is not the case. The ECJ is bound to
draw from Member States' common constitutional traditions,54
and may not uphold measures that are incompatible with the EC
Treaty5 10 which presents an obstacle to legal uniformity in
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. See supra note 427 and accompanying text (discussing deadline variations,
termed variable geometry).
543. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 39.
544. Id.
545. See Refugee, supra note 219 (stating "[h]uman rights and fundamental free-
doms... [are] the only sure foundation for stability and long-term economic develop-
ment.").
546. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 634-35.
547. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
548. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 634-35.
549. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (listing bases for EC law).
550. See supra notes 148-55 (explaining supremacy of EC law and conflicts of laws
with Member States and European Community).
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human rights and other laws.55'
The potential inconsistency in the determinations of the
ECJ and the CHR could result in Member States applying differ-
ent interpretations of human rights law, leading to a loss of con-
tinuity among EC Member States' national laws. Because the Eu-
ropean Community relies on Member States to implement its
policies,552 Member States' viewpoints affect EC standards.'
The assumption that EC conduct will never violate citizens'
rights, therefore, conflicts with the constitutional reality of the
constituent EC parts. 554 Additionally, as compared to treaties
and internal national law, EC law is favored by bonds of law that
are stronger than in other international organizations. 5 The
protection of fundamental rights, therefore, would be most ef-
fective at the EC level.
The Holocaust did not begin in the gas chambers. Rather,
like the present situation in Estonia and Latvia, it began with
race laws and the segregation of specific peoples. 55 6 It is this
type of devastation that the European Community must prevent.
Although the European Community impliedly relies on the
ECHR,557 Europe's jaded past demonstrates that it must signify a
greater attachment to its values by amending the EC Treaty and
becoming a Contracting Party of the ECHR itself.558
The fight against racism and intolerance is an inseparable
part of Europe's history and continues to be a worthy and neces-
551. BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 8, at 145.
552. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
553. BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 8, at 166.
554. Dominick, supra note 3, at 668.
555. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (stating supremacy of EC law).
556. Douglas Broome, Why We Still Have Genocide: The Nazis Weren't the Last to Prac-
tice Mass Slaughter, Although They Should Have Been, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 23 1996, at F 11
[hereinafter Genocide].
The patterns repeat. In May 1992, Natasa Komijenovic graduated from high
school in Prijador, Bosnia, but the young artist Was a Croat in a Serb-domi-
nated town. That summer, the Croats were forced to wear identifying arm-
bands and banned from public facilities and stores, a pattern set in Nazi Ger-
many.
Id.
557. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (stating reliance of EC law on
ECHR).
558. See supra notes 51745 and accompanying text (suggesting necessity of acces-
sion due to firm basis of human rights in continued stability and growth).
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sary struggle.55 9 Even in the wake of the devastation of World
War II,560 Europe realized its own weakness 56' and demonstrated
that irreconcilable enemies could work together to achieve the
common goal of future European unity.562 The European Com-
munity should continue to pursue this goal and should not fear
a change of constitutional significance, for it is only by reassur-
ing the protection and importance of human rights that the Eu-
ropean Community can achieve complete peace and unity.563
While EC law incorporates some of the principles of the
ECHR and requires EC institutions to apply those principles,
there is no institutional framework to which the European Com-
munity itself is accountable. It is inconsistent that because the
European Community is not a member of the ECHR, it has
greater leeway in the infringement of human rights than individ-
ual Member States. 564 Human rights violations can and do occur
in civilized, democratic societies. Neither EC Member States,
states awaiting membership, nor the European Community it-
self, should be able to hide behind a veil of state sovereignty, the
principle of solidarity, 565 or a shroud of secrecy to justify deny-
ing citizens comprehensive protection of their human rights.
G. The European Community Can Participate Fully in the ECHR's
Institutional Framework
Amendment of the EC Treaty to permit the European Com-
munity to accede to the ECHR presents questions regarding the
composition of the CHR and its jurisdiction with respect to EC
559. See supra note 55 (noting importance European Community places on elimi-
nating discrimination).
560. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 2.
561. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 5.
562. O'Keeffe, supra note 8, at 2.
563. See CROSSROADS, supra note 319, at 1 (stating that denial of human rights is
historically at heart of conflict).
564. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 278-79, § V, 1 2. The Belgian Government
stresses the need to avoid divergent interpretations in EC case-law and that of the or-
gans of the Convention. Id. It notes that the "system of remedies in Community law,
which excludes actions for annulment by an individual in respect of an act that is not of
direct and individual concern to him, affords less protection than that of the Conven-
tion" and the Member States that belong to the Convention. Id. This is a democratic
deficit, referring to the lack of a catalogue of European constitutional law, similar to the
Bill of Rights in the United States. Id.; see Internationale Handelsgessellschaf, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 540 (discussing term "democratic deficit"); Edward, supra note 508, at 119-20
n.45.
565. U.N. Draft, supra note 322.
EUROPEAN UNION TREATY REFORM
and national affairs.56 6 These concerns, however, are unsur-
mountable. At present, the ECHR is not equipped to incorpo-
rate the European Community into its organizational structure.
Member States, however, have suggested ways in which the Euro-
pean Community could participate in the ECHR control bodies,
particularly the CHR, that would require little restructuring on
the part of both the European Community and the ECHR.567
Suggestions for EC participation in the CHR include the
CHR appointment of no judge from the European Commu-
nity,56 the appointment of a judge of special status to vote only
on EC matters,56 9 and the appointment of a permanent EC
judge with the same status as other judges. °5 7  This last sugges-
tion appears to grant the European Community the most influ-
ence, yet it would still participate on an equal level with other
contracting parties. In order to deal with the separation of insti-
tutions, the ECHR should appoint the judge to the CHR who
could not be a member of the ECJ at the same time.571 The
selection of candidates for this judicial position would be an in-
ternal EC matter in which the ECHR could not interfere. 572 This
participation would allow the European Community to be ac-
tively involved in the control of the CHR.
Additionally, the Council of Europe raised the question of
whether EC accession to the ECHR, particularly to the CHR,
places in question both the exclusive jurisdiction the ECJ en-
joys573 and the autonomy of the EC legal order.574 The CHR,
however, is unable to repeal or amend a provision of national, or
analogously, EC law and may only impose on a contracting party
an obligation to bring about a certain result. 575 The European
Community would be subjected to the same requirements. It is
this obligation that Member States opposing accession question.
566. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 269-70, § I, 6. Accession to the ECHR
itself would raise institutional questions. Id.
567. See supra notes 414-18 and accompanying text (presenting suggestions for
Community participation in ECHR and solutions for jurisdictional issues).
568. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 282-84, § VI, 1.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. See supra notes 253, 409 (citing text of EC Treaty Articles 164 and 219).
574. Opinion 2/94, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. at 270-71, 9-10.
575. Refugee, supra note 219.
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The mere requirement of a specified outcome, however, is a
minimal requirement and does not promote any particular
methods of achievement. Furthermore, the European Commu-
nity is no longer solely based on a common market.5 76 It has
evolved into a living organism, and all parts must work together
in order for it to survive. Human rights are at the heart of this
organism with human rights, implications flowing throughout its
other controlling organs. 7
H. Accession to the ECHR Would Foster European Growth
The commitment to broaden and deepen the European
Community involves not only growth in membership, but also is
inseparable from an increase in competences.5 7s This growth is
occurring in a period of heightened sensitivity to human
rights.57 9 Because human rights violations can and do occur in
civilized, democratic societies,"s as the European Union contin-
ues to grow and diversify, accession becomes more necessary.
The aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater
unity between its Member States. One of the methods by which
that aim must be pursued is the maintenance and further reali-
zation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 581 The
rights enumerated in the ECHR are common social values,582 ac-
knowledging many rights and freedoms already established in
EC law, although not in a formal, legal form. The changing na-
ture of the European Community requires that such rights be
incorporated formally into the EC legal order.
Opponents of accession disfavor EC Treaty amendment to
allow EC accession to the ECHR based on the principle of sub-
576. See supra note 491 and accompanying text (suggesting that Member States will
be comforted by accession to ECHR and formalized human rights protection).
577. See supra note 545 and accompanying text (stating that human rights form
foundation for stability in modern nations).
578. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (discussing EC competences).
579. COMMUNITY METHODS, supra note 17, at 3.
580. See supra notes 319-70 and accompanying text (describing human rights con-
cerns in Europe); U.N. Draft, supra note 322. "[D]emocracy provide[s] the best defense
for the human rights of the individual .... [h]owever, human rights violations [can]
and [do] take place in democratic systems." Id. There is, therefore, an "urgent need to
strengthen the international monitoring mechanism over the rule of international hu-
manitarian law and other generally recognized standards in the field of human rights."
Id.
581. Id.
582. Opinion 2/94 at § VI, 1 1.
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sidiarity58s which limits EC competences.584 EC competences,
however, already have expanded to cover the extensive and
growing reach of EC influence.5 85 It would be inconsistent with
such dramatic growth for the European Community not to
demonstrate its own commitment to the protection of its citi-
zens' human rights.5 6 Considering the newly-placed emphasis
on EC citizenship,58 7 a failure to recognize human rights could
undermine general, public support of European integration and
potentially lead to nationalistic attitudes of the past.5 8 This
would be detrimental to the desire of a European group identity,
at the heart of which lies the protection of human rights.8 9
The broadening and deepening of EC geography requires
further growth in its competences. As EC competences increase,
so do its duties, among which the protection of human rights is
primary. Amendment of the EC Treaty to allow for accession to
the ECHR would reflect this emphasis on European Community-
wide protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
It is a misconception that the introduction of the European
Community into the institutional system of the ECHR would en-
croach upon Member State and EC competences.5 90 The intro-
duction of EU citizenship has created a direct link between Eu-
ropean integration and the people it is meant to serve.5 9 1 This
exemplifies only one of the many increases in EC competences
in which the Member States have also fully participated.59 2
Protecting human rights is included in the responsibilities
for which growth in EC competences calls. 95 Such protection at
the EC level, which the ECHR could provide, would ensure EU
citizens individual liberties, much like the attention given to
rights in the economic and geographical spheres of the Euro-
583. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining principle of sub-
sidiarity).
584. See supra note 478 (listing new EC competences).
585. COMMUNITY METHODS, supra note 17, at 2-3.
586. Id.
587. See supra note 392 (citing EU citizenship).
588. COMMUNrrY METHODS, supra note 17, at 2.
589. Id. at 4.
590. Id. at 2.
591. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 64.
592. COMMUNrry METHODS, supra note 17, at 2.
593. Id. at 2-3.
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pean Community. 94 This constitutionalized control of human
rights protection is necessary in a period of rapid EU growth in
other areas. 95
Amendment of the EC Treaty to allow the European Com-
munity to accede to the ECHR would overcome a legal challenge
caused, in part, by EC growth. The treaties establishing the Eu-
ropean Community do no more than sketch out the rudimen-
tary features of EC social protection. 96 The purpose of the Pro-
toco1597 annexed to the TEU and to the treaties establishing the
European Union was to close the door that the ECJ's interpreta-
tion of the EC Treaty59 8 and their failure to focus on this impor-
tant social dimension left open. 599 To account for this weak link
in the EC Treaty, the Commission drew up social action plans
that were then proposed to the Council.600 Eventually, the
Council passed a number of important directives, such as those
to improve health and safety at work.60 1 Later provisions were
passed providing minimum levels of protection in Member
States for migrant workers and providing for the equal treatment
for men and women at work.6"' The sheer complexity of such
decisions at the EC level hamper the emergence of the necessary
steps towards integration, and demonstrate the greater effective-
ness of the ECHR.6 °3 Moreover, this progression in law demon-
strates prior EC actions addressing legal challenges that have
arisen.
The human rights deficiency in the treaties establishing and
regulating the European Community has been noted in the past.
The changing nature of the European Community and increas-
ing awareness of this problem, however, is forcing the European
Community to make a decision regarding the regulation and
protection of human rights in the European Community for the
present and for the future.60 4 The need for increased EC com-
594. Id. at 2.
595. Id. at 3.
596. Id.
597. Weiler & Haltern, supra note 137, at 448 n.22.
598. See id. (relying on SPUK v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-4685).
599. BORCHARDT, supra note 9, at 64.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. Id. at 79.
604. See Refugee, supra note 219 (discussing requests to U.N. organs and agencies to
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petencies in the human rights arena should not be left to future
leaders. This could potentially lead to the destruction of pro-
gress already made toward a unified Europe. In an era of inter-
national implementation of humanitarian law,6° it is imperative
that the European Community not fall behind the times. The
European Community, therefore, should amend the EC Treaty
and constitutionally recognize the ECHR through accession and
formal incorporation of its principles. °6
I. Present Inconsistencies in Human Rights Laws Could Thwart
Continued European Growth
The strength of the bond created by the EC Treaty will be
weakened by differing human rights laws among Member
States.1°7 Such inconsistency would impede the functioning of
the EC system, place the goals of integration in peril,608 and
cause legal cohesion in the European Community to dis-
integrate." 9 Accordingly, concrete and uniform interpretation
of human rights laws throughout the European Community has
become a necessary base, without which the European Commu-
nity could not continue to exist.610
European Community accession to the ECHR is the best so-
lution to stop human rights violations, and will assist in inviting
new Member States into the European Community by removing
the potential for ambiguous legal guidelines and differing and
difficult application of EC laws. EC law is supreme over conflict-
ing national laws.611 This doctrine of supremacy determines the
relationship between the laws of Member States and directly ap-
plicable EC law.612 Amendment of the EC Treaty to allow for EC
accession to the ECHR would provide a solution for conflicting
intensify their contributions to system-wide efforts to promote and protect human
rights, in light of fiftieth anniversary of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (A/
C.3/51/L.35)).
605. Tribunal on former Yugoslavia brings accountability to Individuals, Part 1, Nov. 26,
1996, available in WEsTLAw, 1996 WL 13552847.
606. See supra notes 481-603 and accompanying text.
607. Zuleeg, supra note 7, at 624.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 10 (stating that it is challenge to avoid such outcome).
610. See supra notes 517, 545 and accompanying text (stating that human rights is
at base of Community's foundation).
611. LASOK & STONE, supra note 170, at 21 (citing Van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.R.
at 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. at 105).
612. Id. at 23.
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laws because the requirement that directly applicable EC law is
supreme would fully integrate the ECHR into both the EC legal
order and Member States' constitutional laws. As the European
Community continues to grow, it also must continue to over-
come obstacles.6 13 The lack of self-contained, enumerated
human rights laws, such as are provided by the ECHR, presents
such a challenge. An open door61 in the human rights arena
presents an especially dangerous situation, considering Europe's
history of ethnic and political intolerance.
CONCLUSION
The areas covered by existing EC laws must continue to ex-
pand with the geography of the European Community. When
confronted with a situation such as a deficiency in human rights
protection, the European Community should make the appro-
priate amendments to the EC Treaty to foster a smoother transi-
tion from distinct and isolated states, to a unified Europe with
no internal frontiers. The European Community must take a
necessary step to address, prevent, and punish violations of
human rights at the EC level, and ensure consistent application
and enforcement of violations against present and future Mem-
ber States and EC institutions. Amendment of the EC Treaty to
allow the European Community to accede to the ECHR is this
necessary step and would provide an institutional framework
that would encourage unity, peace, freedom, and prosperity in
Europe. Such an amendment would involve EC Member States
sacrificing certain traditional and arguably outdated ideals of
sovereignty for a more lofty, progressive goal of complete Euro-
pean unity. EC accession to the ECHR would allow for crucial
development in EC law and would provide the cohesive human
rights legislation that the European Community needs in order
to continue to grow and thrive economically, socially, respon-
sibly, and consistently. The ECJ has determined that accession
cannot occur under existing EC law. The EC Treaty, therefore,
mIust be amended to permit European Community accession to
the ECHR.
613. See supra note 74 (discussing Intergovernmental Conference and suggesting
further reform to EC laws and competences are necessary); LASOK & STONE, supra note
170, at 64 (discussing challenges European Community must meet).
614. See supra note 425 (presenting hypothetical in which states apply differing
forms of EC law and danger of open-textured treaties).
